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The events of September 11, 2001, and the reactions that followed sparked a 
surge in international terrorist organizations, resulting in increased threat to U.S. national 
security. Although military operations have had some short-term successes against 
violent, extremist organizations (VEOs), they are an insufficient long-term counter-
extremism strategy. It is apparent that a new approach and new way of analysis are 
necessary. We examine the problem by focusing on Al-Shabaab, a VEO in Somalia, with 
attention to its stages of development. Using unclassified sources, we apply three 
theoretical frameworks to determine whether deterrence might be effective as a 
countervailing strategy at each stage. For Phase One, beginning before the organization’s 
establishment, we look at historical and cultural context. Phase Two analyzes formation 
and growth from the perspective of social-movement theory, and Phase Three employs a 
structural perspective, using organizational-design theory, to the VEO in its mature form. 
Conclusions are drawn, based on deterrence theory, for each stage in the VEO’s 
evolution. This research provides a foundation by which policy and strategy makers may 
gain insight into the seams, gaps, strengths, and weakness of VEOs as they change over 
time, and where deterrent strategies may be applied to advantage. 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF A VIOLENT, EXTREMIST 
ORGANIZATION 
On March 26, 2015, General David M. Rodriguez briefed the United States 
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on U.S. Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM) 
current trends, strategic approach, long-term objectives, immediate priorities, and future 
requirements. General Rodriguez informed the committee that “Africa continues to 
present a broad spectrum of opportunities and challenges to the United States and our 
allies and partners.”1 The general indicated that the regional security threat and primary 
source of conflict in Somalia was the violent, extremist organization (VEO) Al-Shabaab. 
While noting recent tactical successes, Rodriguez advised that this VEO remains a 
persistent threat, despite unilateral, interagency, and multinational partner efforts. 
Military operations have had some short-term success against VEOs in the Horn of 
Africa, but have proved an insufficient long-term counter-extremism strategy.2 It has 
become apparent that new approaches to the problem of Al-Shabaab, and VEOs 
generally, are necessary. 
This thesis looks at the VEO problem in the Horn of Africa—specifically, at Al-
Shabaab, based primarily in Somalia. For deeper understanding of the VEO phenomenon 
and the role of deterrence, we analyze Al-Shabaab’s progress as an organization, finding 
three phases in its development and ascertaining whether deterrence is likely to be an 
effective strategy in each. We created a model unlike current approaches, which breaks 
this evolution into three phases and provides a much more intuitive and tailored 
deterrence solution in each phase. This thesis explores the degree to which the use of 
such tailored, multi-disciplinary approaches gives the U.S. additional leverage over the 
VEO challenge.       
                                                 
1 David M. Rodriguez, General, USA, Commander United States Africa Command, 2015 Statement of 
USAFRICOM before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 26 March 2015), 1. 
2 Rodriguez, 2015 Statement of USAFRICOM,  1–19. 
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A. THE RATIONALE FOR A NEW APPROACH 
The novel approach we take was motivated by three factors. First, we sought new 
solutions to an intractable problem that has been exhaustively analyzed from 
conventional perspectives. Second, it seemed logical to examine VEOs according to the 
way they naturally evolve. Finally, instead of focusing wholly on deterring a VEO from 
acts of destruction, we sought ways to prevent its coming into existence by forestalling 
the movement before it gains identity and strength. In conjunction with this goal, we 
reexamine the utility of deterrence and coercive diplomacy against VEOs across our three 
phases. 
B. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DETERRENCE 
This research presents a framework comprised of models for studying VEOs; the 
framework uses an appropriate theory for each phase of a VEO’s evolution and applies 
deterrence theory throughout. Deterrence is not the quintessential solution to complex 
problems, but it is an important strategy, the potential of which has been untapped due to 
common misperceptions.3 It is generally agreed that deterring VEOs early requires less 
coercion later, but more foresight, and that doing so incurs substantial risks. This research 
finds, counter-intuitively, that it may actually be better and more effective to deter 
organizations when they are mature, as there are significant problems with using 
deterrence or coercion too early. Responses and deterrent signals should not be driven by 
crisis or exigency, but by forethought, with a clear understanding of context and of whom 
and what to deter. Moreover, allowing a VEO’s true colors or ideology to play out may 
ultimately benefit antiterrorism by allowing a population to move past its initial 
enthusiasms and reconcile itself to the existing government—at the same time 
undermining the probability that similar organizations will gain support in the future.  
                                                 
3 We use the term “deterrence” throughout as signifying both the standard definition from traditional 
deterrence theory (to discourage somebody from taking action or prevent something from happening, 
especially by making somebody feel afraid or anxious) and a more flexible definition, which includes, 
concept, research program, political issue, influencing, shaping and prevention efforts. For more detail, 
refer to Jeffrey W. Knopf “Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political 
Issue,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James 




The application of deterrence strategies to VEOs has largely been dismissed due 
to both misperceptions and the conviction that deterrence has already failed. President 
George W. Bush addressed the topic of deterrence and terrorism during his 2002 West 
Point graduation speech. 
For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War 
doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies 
still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the 
promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against 
shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend…We 
cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot 
put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation 
treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully 
materialize, we will have waited too long.4  
The first difficulty with that position is that it ignores a VEO’s evolution and 
growth over time. This thesis posits that there is ample opportunity to implement 
deterrence early on, before any high-profile attacks. Moreover, a VEO’s successful 
carrying out of an attack does not mean deterrence is no longer useful. In all likelihood, 
the original deterrent was lacking, due to improper communication or misunderstanding 
of the costs and benefits from the enemy’s perspective. Finally, even if these potential 
deterrents are evaluated as nothing more than a form of coercive diplomacy or 
compellence, there remain numerous indirect ways that deterrence may be useful—for 
example, in deterring governments from bad decisions or a populace from joining the 
terrorist cause. Our thesis is limited to a single organization, in view of the detailed 
analysis required; we chose Al-Shabaab as a representative Islamist VEO that is mature 
enough to have produced the data needed.  
Among our conclusions is that U.S. national strategy may be exacerbating the 
VEO problem around the world. The U.S. has grown accustomed to applying force in 
regional conflicts without regard to context, failing to account for an organization’s 
                                                 
4 George W. Bush, President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, West Point, New York: 
Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2002.   
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emergence, evolution, and reason for existence. This ill-informed strategy is then likely 
to retard the natural progression of internal problem-solving within a region, creating 
reliance and helplessness. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Our research is laid out in the following way: in Chapter II, we introduce a new 
model, which we call the “evolutionary growth process” (EGP) of a VEO. This model 
describes three phases, to be viewed through contextual, social-movement, and 
organizational lenses. First, we establish the cultural context in “Phase One”. Next, we 
borrow social-movement theory (SMT) to examine  “Phase Two” and organizational-
design theory to examine “Phase Three.” Chapter III covers the cultural and historical 
context of Somalia. In Chapters IV, V, and VI, we apply the model framework to 
pinpoint when, where, and how best to apply deterrence throughout the phases of the 








II. THE EVOLUTIONARY GROWTH-PROCESS MODEL 
For this research, we developed a new model to examine more thoroughly the 
problem of VEOs and how best to deter them. In this chapter, we explain our model, and 
then break it down by discussing each of its three constituent phases and the literature 
regarding the theories employed.    
There are many types of life cycles, and they all begin and end. Rather than look 
at the full trajectory of the VEO life cycle, we focus on the stages from preconception to 
maturity, which we call the “evolutionary growth process,” or EGP. The EGP is divided 
into three phases, as depicted in Figure 1. The initial phase, Phase One, is the period 
before the VEO’s inception, when malcontent begins to create disequilibrium; in other 
words, an opportunity arises for change in a system. Phase Two sees the emergence and 
initial growth of a reformatory movement, and Phase Three is the period of peak VEO 
power and activity, when the organization has built a distinctive organizational structure.  
Figure 1.  Evolutionary Growth Process (EGP) 
 
We consider deterrence across all the phases of an entity’s EGP. To develop what 
we need to know about Phase One, we examine historical and cultural context. Context is 
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clearly also important throughout the EGP. Because Phase Two focuses on inception, we 
use social-movement theory as our analytical tool. In Phase Three, organizational-design 
theory provides the primary lens of analysis. The breakdown into discrete phases is 
somewhat artificial, as the context and duration of phases will differ from one VEO to the 
next. However, this structuring is conducive to discussion and insight by enabling us to 
barrow analytical tools from different disciplines. We now turn to the specific issue area 
we wish to explore—deterrence theory—or, more specifically, how our EGP framework 
enhances one’s ability to apply the logic of deterrence theory to the problem of VEOs.  
A. DETERRENCE THEORY 
Because deterrence is discussed throughout the thesis, we will begin by first 
reviewing what deterrence is, the literature regarding deterrence, and the deterrence 
models from which we draw.   
Deterrence is a strategy by which states or entities attempt to manipulate the 
decisions of others, by various means, to achieve specific goals. As defined by John 
Mearsheimer, “Deterrence, in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to 
initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs 
and risks.”5 Deterrence policy received its first modern update with the advent of nuclear 
weapons. In 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles presented a doctrine of 
deterrence built around a theory of punishment of the aggressor, or violator, of a given 
norm.6 The atomic bomb was a new technology that demanded a reexamination of how 
state actors engage in conflict and precipitated a successful restructuring of deterrence at 
the international level. As an alternative to direct conflict, states turned to strategies of 
nuanced political negotiations to coerce or intimidate adversaries into compliance. If a 
dispute escalated beyond talking, states might choose to pursue a proxy war to resolve a 
conflict, using conventional means but avoiding direct, force-on-force encounters that 
might trigger a nuclear conclusion.7 In essence, deterrence is a simple equation of 
                                                 
5 John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14. 
6 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 145, 8–9. 
7 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2008), 7–8, 34, 
190. 
 7
weighing costs and benefits; in order for deterrence to be successful, the costs must 
outweigh the benefits. Further, deterrence moves the locus of “action” from the 
battlefield (war fighting) to the mind of the opponent. Deterrence is not about “winning” 
as much as it is about influencing the opponent through a form of communication that 
may, at times, involve the application of force. 
Scholarly research on deterrence theory during the Cold War era progressed in 
stages, which Robert Jervis describes as “three waves.” The first wave, during the early 
nuclear era, relied on massive use of force; the second, in the late 1950s, focused on 
bipolar international relations; and the third wave, in the 1970s, explored positive 
inducement rather than the threat of force.8,9 
Today, deterrence has fallen on hard times. Far from the being cornerstone of 
U.S. policy, as it was during the Cold War, “deterrence today looks very much like 
yesterday’s solution to yesterday’s dominant problem.”10 Jeffrey Knopf labels today’s 
attitude as the “fourth wave of deterrence” theory, which emphasizes dissuading VEOs 
and rogue governments through both denial and punishment.11 Research on the fourth 
wave, as Knopf points out, broadens the focus to include non-military options of 
retribution, including diplomatic, economic, and informational coercion.12 
1. The Question of Deterring VEOs 
On the question of deterring VEOs, a clear divide has emerged. On one side are 
scholars and pundits who believe that NSAs cannot be deterred.13 As Paul Davis and 
Brian Jenkins assert in a RAND study, “The concept of deterrence is both too limiting 
                                                 
8 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited” World Politics 31, no. 02 (1979): 289–324. 
9 Freedman, Deterrence , 21. 
10 Colin S. Gray, “Maintaining Effective Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Institute, Aug 2003, v. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub211.pdf (Accessed Aug 7, 2014). 
11 Knopf, Jeffrey W. “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research.” Contemporary Security Policy 31, 
no. 1 (2010): 18. 
12 Knopf, “Fourth Wave in Deterrence” 18. 
13 Freedman, Deterrence , 24. 
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and too naive to be applicable to the war on terrorism.”14 President George W. Bush in 
the 2002 National Security Strategy reinforced this notion, saying, “Traditional concepts 
of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy.”15 In contrast, some cite lessons 
from behavioral logic, arguing that the modus operandi of VEOs is similar to that of 
criminal organizations and therefore VEOs may be deterred via traditional criminological 
deterrence means.16,17 The more clear, proportional, and consistent the punishment, the 
more effective acts of deterrence will be.18 
2. The Three Pillars of Action 
The cleavage between these schools of thought appears to be based on divergent 
interpretations of three human factors, which Robert Trager and Dessilava Zagorcheva 
call the three pillars: rationality, motivation, and communication (or the return-address 
problem).19 
a. Rational Self-Interest  
Michael R. Geerken and Walter R. Gove observe, “Deterrence theorists usually 
begin with a model of man as profit maximizer, that is, as a calculator of profit from 
estimates of gain and cost resulting from the projected act”20—in other words, they 
assume that human beings are rational in their choices. Robert Pape believes terrorists are 
rational actors, and his study provides empirical evidence that suggests suicide terrorist 
attacks do produce some level of concession from their adversaries.21 Jeffery Berejikian 
                                                 
14 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counter terrorism: A 
Component in the War on al-Qaeda (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), xviii, 19. 
15 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington,DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, September, 2002), 15. 
16 Freedman, Deterrence, 124. 
17 Ariel Merari, “Deterring Fear: Government Responses to Terrorist Attacks,” Harvard International 
Review 23, no. 4 (Winter, 2002), 26–31. 
18 Freedman, Deterrence, 8. 
19 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,” 
International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005), 87–123, 87. 
20 Michael R. Geerken and Walter R. Gove, Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations, Law & 
Society Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring, 1975), 497. 
21 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House, 2005. 
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disagrees; in his view, decision makers “are apt to overweigh losses with respect to 
comparable gains, and tend to be risk averse when confronted with choices between gains 
while risk acceptant when confronted with losses.”22 As rationality pertains to VEOs, it 
should be viewed from the perspective of the VEO’s ordered preferences, not one’s own. 
While the literature on the rationality of VEOs is divided, we believe that understanding 
an organization’s ordered preferences may assist in perceiving its rationality, which 
might otherwise be overlooked if the possibility of ratiocination among VEOs is 
dismissed. 
b. Motivation 
States often misunderstand the context and motivation behind VEO strategies and 
thus adopt deterrents that fail.23 The influence of key players in an organization is a 
factor often ignored by those convinced that terrorists cannot be deterred. Among most 
studies focused on suicidal attackers, VEOs have broad regional objectives that are 
achieved through strategy, whether this is implementing sharia law, establishing a 
caliphate, or forcing regime changes that increase their power. In this sense, VEOs use 
rational and normative reasoning very deliberately to achieve strategy—this is 
manifested, for example, in choosing where and whom to attack (and on what scale) and 
how to exploit the media. Although a few terrorists may behave irrationally, the majority 
calculate the cost–benefit ratio of their decisions carefully. The mere fact that VEOs are 
organized and can operate with some degree of success suggests that most participants 
are rational and can thus be influenced.24 
                                                 
22 Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 
2 (Sage Publications, Ltd., Mar., 2002), 165. 
23 Loren Thompson, “What if Deterrence Doesn't Work Anymore? Five Reasons to Worry,” Forbes 
(August 18, 2014). 
24 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,” 
International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005), 87–123, 88; Bowen, Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-
State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism, 54–70, 62; Colby, “Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the 
Threat of Retaliation,” 43–59, xi. 
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c. Communication 
For a deterrence strategy to work, the rational actors involved must be able to 
communicate, understand the perceptions of the parties involved, and be able to 
anticipate likely reprisals.25 In essence, deterrence requires a deep understanding of the 
enemy. Deterrence is stage setting: “by announcement, rigging the trip-wire, by incurring 
the obligation—by waiting.”26 Unacceptable behaviors are defined, potential punishments 
are communicated by the state, and the warning is followed up with a demonstration of 
resolve to show the threat is real.27 In general, deterrence is an interaction between two 
parties, in which one signals the other not to act in some predefined manner; the signal is 
credible only if the adversary knows he has the power to follow through. Thus the 
concept of signaling is integral to conflict prevention, particularly of large-scale 
conventional or nuclear war.28 
The difficulties of signaling VEOs are obvious. While states can reach VEOs 
almost anywhere on the globe, several factors make deterring or influencing them nearly 
impossible. First, a VEO hierarchy is often decentralized and dispersed over large areas 
of land. The difficulty of identifying leaders, decision makers, and logisticians, as well as 
operators and their precise locations, makes it problematic to avert their actions. VEOs 
may change their structure organizationally, based upon pressures from the international 
community. They tend to evolve “towards more networked organizational forms but can 
manifest hierarchical, blended and networked features”29 that allow flexibility, 
decentralization, and the ability to operate with impunity, especially in failed or 
ungoverned territory. Second, VEOs are often dispersed among civilian populations and 
deliberately operate from their midst. Finally, due to labeling practices, nascent VEOs 
                                                 
25 Freedman, Deterrence, 26–29. 
26 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 71. 
27 Frank P. Harvey and Patrick James, “Deterrence and Compellence in Iraq,” in Complex Deterrence: 
Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 223–224. 
28 Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait 
Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 2 (2000), 227–245. 
29 Robert Bunker J, “Defeating Violent Non-state Actors,” Parameters 4, no. 43 (2013), 59. 
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may be labeled as terrorist organizations early on, which immediately limit official 
communications by some entities.30 
3. The Two Categories of Deterrence 
The concept of deterrence is divided into two main categories: deterrence by 
punishment and by denial. According to John Mearsheimer, “there is a well-known 
distinction between deterrence based on punishment, which involves threatening to 
destroy ... and deterrence based on denial, which requires convincing an opponent that he 
will not attain his goals.”31 
a. Deterrence by Punishment 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union—and increasingly after 9/11—most states have 
employed an active, constant, eye-for-an-eye response to challenges from non-state 
VEOs.32 It has been argued that in asymmetric conflicts between sovereign countries and 
rogue VEOs, deterrent effects are likely limited.33 To combat this nontraditional 
deterrence problem, some nations, including the United States, have adopted a 
preemptive stance, attempting to attack the enemy before he can strike.34 To the extent 
that military actions trend towards a strike-first mentality, deterrence is being replaced by 
preemption. Emphatically, preemption is not deterrence. 
Striking an adversary first is not deterrence, and often results in negative 
unintended consequences. Deterrence by the threat of punishment involves 
communicating a realistic threat that is equal or more important to the enemy than the 
potential benefits to be gained by carrying out the activity contemplated. In the case of 
                                                 
30 Bunker, “Defeating Violent Non-state Actors,” 57–65. 
31 John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 1st ed. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1983,14–15. 
32 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 1–5. 
33 Wyn Q. Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 1 (April, 2004): 61–62. 
34 David P. Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks,” Political Science Quarterly 121, no. 4 
(2006): 546. 
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VEOs, potential punishment is the deterrence that often keeps these organizations from 
carrying out violent, extremist acts. 
The literature describing VEO deterrence by punishment covers the spectrum 
from non-military punishment to large-scale military operations and nuclear retaliation.35 
But without a nation or population to defend, non-state VEOs have no responsibility for 
the consequences of their actions and are not constrained to respond to the misery they 
induce. Indeed, they may rely on the suffering of the innocent as a component in a 
rational strategy. 
b. Deterrence by Denial 
Deterrence by denial is a defensive strategy that denies (hardens) the prospective 
attacker targets and means (e.g., WMDs, popular support) and most importantly 
marginalizes gains or desired outcomes to discourage terrorist acts.36 Sovereign countries 
can expect comparatively reliable deterrent results by refining national security and 
decreasing soft-target exposure to VEOs. However, this is a constant, resource-
demanding practice, similar to the eye-for-an-eye, experimental offensive use of military 
power, and does not preclude VEOs from choosing to exploit soft targets instead.37 As 
long as a VEO’s political motivations remain undeterred, the threat endures. 
4. Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy  
Compellence and coercive diplomacy differ slightly from deterrence. Lawrence 
Freedman distinguishes between deterrence and compellence as the difference between 
saying “they should not act for fear of consequences or must act for fear of 
consequences.”38 Thomas Schelling explains that compellence “usually involves 
initiating an action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or become 
                                                 
35 Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework,” The Washington Quarterly 
28, no. 3 (Summer, 2005), 187–199, 194–195; Gerald M. Steinberg, “Rediscovering Deterrence After 
September 11, 2001,” Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints No. 467 (2001), http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp467.htm 
(Accessed October 23, 2015).  
36 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It can be done,” 87–123, 91, 99. 
37 Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism,” 61–62. 
38 Freedman, Deterrence, 26. 
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harmless, only if the opponent responds.”39 Compellence requires much more active 
coercion than does deterrence, often requiring active military force or diplomatic 
measures such as sanctions. The accomplishment or failure of deterrence is contingent 
upon the achievement of coercion.  
Compellence and coercive diplomacy, as they relate to VEOs, are used to attempt 
to compel a VEO to stop terrorism already underway. Deterrence, on the other hand, aims 
to prevent VEOs from undertaking these activities in the first place. It is commonly 
asserted that if one is resorting to compellence or coercive diplomacy, then deterrence has 
failed. However, this calculus is misleading, in that it appears to assume that deterrence is 
no longer useful or possible once attacks have begun. 
For foreign policy and deterrence to be effective, a high level of commitment and 
understanding of the enemy’s ordered preferences is required. This starts with a clear 
definition of America’s vital national interests. “It is the nation’s interest that must drive 
foreign policy, not abstract notions of values and morality, which clearly are defined 
differently by different administrations.”40 Lowther and Lucius’s article “Identifying 
America’s Vital Interests” lays out a logical and compelling argument for a “transition 
from a value-focused foreign policy to an interest-focused foreign policy.”41 
Reexamining the basics may contribute to deterrence by supporting signaling that is 
consistent, credible, and able to withstand pressure. We now turn to the three phases of 
the EGP, and lay out the logic of deterrence that can be crafted for each successive phase. 
B. THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE UNDERSTOOD AT EACH PHASE  
Each phase of the EGP offers a unique perspective on VEOs. We use theories 
from social science and organizational design that we believe provide insight into aspects 
of a VEO that traditionally are overlooked. 
                                                 
39 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 72. 
40 Adam B. Lowther and Casey Lucius, “Identifying America’s Vital Interests,” Taylor & Francis, 
2013. 156–66. 
41 Lowther, “Identifying America’s Vital Interests,” 156–66. 
 14
1. Phase One: Culture and Context 
The framework and concept we use in Phase One draws from anthropology and 
can only be informed by the region or country’s specific context and history. A cursory 
surface-level understanding is insufficient for applying effective deterrence. The primary 
focus in Phase One is to understand the cultural and historical context that leads to a 
population being aggrieved, as shown in Figure 2. By understanding and successfully 
deterring these contributing factors, the opportunity for VEOs to form and organize no 
longer exists. In essence, by preventing the factors that lead to an aggrieved population it 
may be possible to prevent a VEO from ever existing. 
Figure 2.  Phase One of the EGP 
 
2. Phase Two: Social-Movement Theory 
Most social movements fail, but a sizable number have successfully changed the 
fabric of their societies (for example, America’s independence movement, civil rights, 
etc). We use social-movement theory to explore Phase Two of Al–Shabaab’s 
evolutionary growth process, as shown in Figure 3. Although social movements have 
myriad goals, they all vie for finite resources (supporters, money, and information) and 
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stem from some type of systemic or structural strain (the cause) followed by the society’s 
rise (the effect) against the status quo (emergence).  
Figure 3.  Phase Two of the EGP 
 
a. Definitions 
Social movements are defined as special-interest groups, resistance movements, 
political parties, or terrorist organizations organized to change a status quo they deem 
unjust.42 Karl-Dieter Opp contends, “Political protest has become a legitimate way and is 
widely used to influence the decision of governments and other organizations.”43 Sidney 
Tarrow states in Power in Movement that contentious politics happen “when collective 
actors join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their 
                                                 
42 This chapter uses the National Research Council of the National Academies’ 2002 terrorism 
definition, articulated in Terrorism: Perspectives from the Behavioral and Social Sciences. “Terrorism is 
the illegal use or threatened use of force or violence, with an intent to coerce societies or governments by 
inducing fear in their populations, typically with political and/or ideological motives and justifications, and 
an ‘extra societal’ element, either, ‘outside society in the case of domestic terrorism or ‘foreign’ in the case 
of international terrorism.”  
43 Karl-Dieter Opp, Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary 
Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis (New York: Routledge, 2009), xiii. 
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claims or the claims of those they claim to represent.”44 Additionally, “a resistance 
movement is defined by the Department of Defense as an organized effort by some 
portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or 
an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”45 A common theme in the 
definition of social movements is that of political phenomena pursued with the intention 
of changing the status quo.46 In this thesis, we define a social movement as a 
homogeneous coalition striving towards a common goal through contentious politics, 
military action, and social methods. Simply put, social movements, as we are using this 
term, foster rebellion against the state, in the form of political protest.  
b. The Political-Process Model 
The political-process model (PPM) was selected because it fits well with the study 
of VEOs and provides insight for DOD planners to deter, disrupt, or neutralize groups 
before they can take root in society.47 The PPM is overlaid on the EGP as illustrated in 
Figure 4. Doug McAdam notes that there are three critical components in movement 
formation: expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and 
cognitive liberation.48 Maryjane Osa observes, “Many empirical studies confirm these 
factors are associated with the incidence of social movements.”49 When these 
components combine with a broad socioeconomic process, conditions become ripe for 
social movements to emerge.50 
                                                 
44 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Third ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4. 
45 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3–05 Special Operations (WashingtonDC: Government Printing 
Office, (16 July 2014), GL-10. 
46 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago, 
Il: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40. 
47 The PPM is an alternative to popular social-movement theories such as the resource-mobilization 
model (RMM), which suggests that the formation of social movements relies on acquiring resources and 
mobilizing members to achieve stated goals. 
48 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 40. 
49 Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to 
Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77. 
50 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 40. 
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Figure 4.  The Political-Process Model 
 
Adopted from: Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), Chapter 3. 
(1) Broad Socioeconomic Process 
A broad socioeconomic process, or “system strain,” influences the chance of 
movement emergence and enhances the bargaining power of the aggrieved population. 
McAdam refers to this dynamic as a “broad socioeconomic process.” Widespread 
dissatisfaction with political, economic, or social conditions raises awareness of injustice, 
thereby motivating people to revolt against the situation. Social movements develop 
through a confluence of connected events that are dispersed over space and aggregate 
over time.51 For example, events may include civil war, a national identity crisis, 
contested governance, civilians as the target of violence, extreme poverty, violation of 
human rights, famine, social injustice, and/or a political elite that accumulates undue 
wealth and power. These broad socioeconomic conditions may spawn social movements 
to meet the needs of the people. 
 
                                                 
51 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 40. 
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(2) Political Opportunity 
Political opportunity is the ability of an opportunistic challenger to rally 
supporters to a common cause and advance their collective political views against an 
incumbent government. For example, there are open societies that allow their population 
to voice grievances (political opportunity), closed societies that violently dissuade 
collective action (limited political opportunity), and failed states that have little, if any, 
control over their population (unlimited political opportunity). Doowan Lee defines 
political opportunity as the “consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent signals to 
social or political actors that either encourage or discourage them to use their internal 
resources to form collective action.”52 Lack of trust in government, suspicion towards the 
political elite, international intervention, and ambitious political parties create 
opportunities for a social movement to fill political voids. Political opportunity can also 
be found in the political landscape itself.  
(3) Indigenous Organizational Strength 
McAdam cites indigenous organizational strength as the ability of a social 
movement to leverage a local community’s resources, thus enabling collective action. 
This “conversion potential” is essentially converting portions of the aggrieved population 
into an active protest movement. A social movement’s conversion potential depends on 
linking multiple groups of like-minded individuals into a base of support sufficient for 
collective action. Conversion potential is linked to mobilization, which is a function of 
four critical factors: membership, communication-network infrastructure, incentives, and 
leadership.53 
(4) Cognitive Liberation 
The final characteristic of McAdam’s PPM, cognitive liberation, originates in 
social psychology. McAdam suggests that while political opportunity and indigenous 
                                                 
52 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 26, no. 
3 (July-September, 2013), 30. 
53 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 43–44. 
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organizational strength may be present, they alone do not precipitate insurgency.54 
Cognitive liberation refers to the message or narrative that a social movement uses to 
enlighten or propagandize people on the events and circumstances around them, 
explaining who is to blame and how they (the social movement) can help. In other words, 
social movements use cognitive liberation to establish a compelling narrative of shared 
grievances and to then propose solutions, clear goals, and a rationale for collective action. 
3. Phase Three: Organizational-Design Theory 
Progressing from Phase Two (social-movement emergence); Phase Three of the 
EGP framework focuses on the bureaucratic aspects of an organization. This phase is 
shown in Figure 5. The open-systems model in organizational-design theory offers 
insights into an organization’s success or failure based on how well it relates to its 
circumstances and environment. Comprehending these factors is useful in understanding 
how organizations should operate to be most effective and for providing policymakers 
with operational recommendations for undermining VEO success. 
Figure 5.  Phase Three of the EGP 
 
                                                 
54 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 48–50. 
 20
a. Organizational Design 
Henry Mintzberg argues that the structure of an organization should not be chosen 
at random; “rather, they should be selected according to internally consistent groupings. 
And these groupings should be consistent with the situation of the organization.”55 If an 
incorrect structure is used that does not match the environment, an organization will not 
operate successfully, and this can lead to organizational failure. The “design” of an 
organization encompasses a variety of aspects; those examined here are its boundary, 
mission or goals, inputs, internal transformation processes, outputs, feedback, and 
environment. The open-systems model provides broad insights for deterring any 
organization.  
b. The Open-Systems Model 
An open system is a set of interrelated and interdependent parts arranged to 
accomplish a mission or purpose. David Hanna asserts that open systems are “dependent 
on their environment in order to survive and are, therefore, open to influence and 
transactions with the outside world as long as they exist.”56 Garrath Morgan explains, 
“Organizations are open systems that need careful management to satisfy and balance 
internal needs and to adapt to environmental circumstances.”57 These interdependent 
parts consist of the boundary, mission and goals, inputs, internal transformation 




                                                 
55 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review, 1981, 2. 
56 David P. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley 
Pub. Co., 1988), 8. 
57 Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization: The Executive Edition, 1st ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications Inc., 1998, 44. 
58 Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 8. 
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Figure 6.  The Open-Systems Model 
 
Adapted from: David P. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance 
(Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1988), 18. 
 A boundary is the imaginary line that delineates a specific organization from 
others that may compete for resources, support, and information towards the overall 
mission and goals. An open system’s boundary is permeable, allowing it to interact with 
and receive feedback from the environment. Hanna argues that boundaries are critical for 
an open system’s continued existence, because they set one organization apart from 
another.59 A mission is essentially a long-term organization’s overall reason for being—
the reason a group works together to achieve a common ideological purpose.60 Operative 
goals are the tasks or activities an organization must perform to fulfill its mission or 
purpose. Operative goals are short-term, day-to-day, specific and measurable outcomes.  
Inputs are the resources, materials, information, and energy from the environment 
required for an organization’s survival that may be transformed into outputs. 
Transformation is the process by which inputs are taken from the environment and 
                                                 
59 Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 9. 
60 Daawa is from the long-standing growth of Wahhabi-influenced Salafi preaching in Somalia, a 
religious outlook that arguably makes the step to armed Salafi-jihadism ideologically easier. 
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changed into outputs. Transformation is where the central work of an organization 
occurs, resulting from interaction among the three core processes of a group. Hanna 
defines a core process as “something directly related to the purpose.”61 The first core 
process pertains to tasks, the activity needed to fulfill a mission or purpose. The second 
involves individuals as they focus their efforts on the fulfillment of a core task, and the 
third, the group process, is the formation of links between individual participants and 
core tasks. How well an organization performs as a group is a function of how well 
leadership balances core processes, divides tasks, communicates goals, and exploits 
individual talents and goals with respect to the mission. Outputs are what an organization 
exports back into the environment, with the expectation of successfully achieving the 
overall mission. These outputs reveal what an organization believes will help attain its 
goals. 
Feedback is information received from the environment, providing the data 
needed to assess whether transformative processes are on target with operative goals and 
mission accomplishment and allowing the organization to morph and adjust in response. 
A successful organization will continually refine its structure, internal processes, outputs, 
and responses, to avoid entropy.62 To operate effectively—and, indeed, to survive—an 
organization depends on inputs such as people, money, resources, and information. 
Hanna argues, “The environment provides the inputs, must accept the outputs, must 
support the purpose, and provides feedback to the system.”63 According to Daft, “the 
organizational environment is defined as all elements that exist outside the boundary of 
the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization.”64 The 
environment includes the country of origin, surrounding culture, diaspora, third-party 
supporters, competitors, and opposition.  
                                                 
61 Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 12. 
62 Africa Briefing, Somalia: Al-Shabaab –It Will be a Long War, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis 
Group Africa Briefing No. 99, 2014, 9–12. 
63 Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 9. 
64 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory & Design, 8th ed., Mason, Ohio: Thompson 
South-Western, 2004, 48. 
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c. Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure refers to the ordered arrangement of members, featuring 
various levels of authority, modes of coordination, job differentiation, and levels of 
training. The organizational structure functions within environments that may vary in 
complexity and may lack the stability needed to achieve organizational goals. Henry 
Mintzberg offers six basic organizational configurations, each based on one primary 
coordinating mechanism and one key component of the organization 
Essentially, every organization has two core functions: division of labor and work 
coordination, as presented in Table 1.  
Table 1.   The Six Types of Organizational Structure 
 
 
Mintzberg observes, “Every organized human activity, from the making of pots to 
the placing of a man on the moon, gives rise to two fundamental and opposing 
requirements: the division of labor into various tasks to be performed, and the 
coordination of these tasks to accomplish the activity.”65 This thesis focuses on both the 
divisional (matrix) and missionary type structures; because Al-Shabaab has 
bureaucratized their organizational structure to match that of a decentralized divisional 
organization and also because ideology is a key facet of Islamist organizations such as 
Al-Shabaab. 
 
                                                 
65 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 
2. 
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(1) Matrix Structure 
Richard Daft’s matrix structure like Mintzberg’s divisional is a hybrid structure 
that has “a strong form of horizontal linkage in which both product and functional 
structures (horizontal and vertical) are implemented simultaneously.”66 Richard Daft 
suggests that for a matrix organization to succeed, “Managers in key roles have specific 
responsibilities. The key roles are top leaders, matrix-bosses, and two-boss employees.”67  
Daft also suggests three conditions must be met for a matrix organization to 
function correctly. First, scarce resources, such as equipment, manpower, and money, 
must be shared across the organization’s regional operations. Notably, Al-Shabaab is 
moderately sized, suggesting that not every region has enough members to assign to 
every full-time functional position. Second, according to Daft, each regional cell must 
possess authority equal to that of headquarters. This aspect creates two bosses for many 
members, but also beneficially decentralizes the organization. Finally, the environment 
must be both complex and uncertain, amalgamating a variety of influences and needs that 
affect the organization.68 This fits Al-Shabaab, as we will see. 
 
                                                 
66 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 6th ed. (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western 
College Publishing, 1997), 666. 
67 Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 6th ed., 666. 
68 Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 6th ed., 224–233. 
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III. SOMALIA: CULTURE AND CONTEXT  
In this chapter, we review some features of Somalia’s cultural and historical 
context in order to trace the conditions that resulted in the formation of Al-Shabaab. To 
begin, we review what has been said about Somalia’s culture as pertinent to the 
development of Al-Shabaab. We then examine Somalia’s history, dividing it into early, 
middle, and late periods. To provide a general understanding of the case before applying 
the three phases of the EGP framework in chapters IV, V, and VI. 
A. CULTURE  
After years of failed policies overseas, it should be apparent that understanding 
the culture and shared experience of a people matters. Many aspects of Somali culture 
can be gleaned from history, but equally important aspects may not be so obvious. The 
following cultural factors are those that scholars and others have found most important to 
consider when dealing with Somalis. 
1. Kinship 
The most elementary and important aspect of Somali culture and politics is 
kinship. The fabric of Somali culture is woven from tight patrilineal relationships defined 
by genealogies. Family bloodlines and clans are the very foundation of Somali culture 
and thus play a critical role in everything that involves the Somali people.69 It is 
impossible for any American, Ethiopian, or other foreigner to grasp the complex history, 
context, and fluid inter- and intra-relationships among these lineages. The relationships 
are so elastic and complex that they even fluctuate based on who people happen to be 
interacting with at any given time.70 
In her book Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone, Anna Simons observes, 
                                                 
69 Ioan Myrddin Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the 
Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961, 1, 2, 
4, 29, 297; Walter S, Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia, Washington, DC: The Joint History Office, 2005, 
5. 
70 Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of 
the Horn of Africa, 1, 2, 4, 29, 297; – Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia, 5. 
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Traditionally Somalis had never had a social structure outsiders could 
see… [Furthermore] Somalis were also adept at reworking this structure, 
situationally… These were the facts that all outside judgments should have 
been based on, not who was allied with whom at the moment. Without 
context what could such associations mean anyway? After all, who was 
allied with whom today in Mogadishu could not predict how fallings-out 
might occur tomorrow, or new alliances be put together the day after.71 
The five major clans, from largest to smallest as a percentage of the population, 
are the Hawiya, Issaq, Darod, Rahanweyn, and Dir.72 The approximate clan percentages 
and locations are identified in Figure 7.  
Figure 7.  Major Clan Distribution and Approximate Location 
 
Adopted from: Mohammed, Abdul-Aziz. "Somalia and the 'Ugly Clan Federalism'." The 
African Executive. Accessed March 22, 2015. 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/article_print.php?article=8000. 
                                                 
71 Anna Simons, Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, 203. 
72 Sam Voron, “Somali Clans and their Percentage of the Population 2002,” Somalia Amateur Radio, 
Accessed November 14, 2015, https://sites.google.com/site/somaliaamateurradio/somalia_population_maps 
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Clans and their subdivisions, or sub-clans, determine many of the coalitions, alliances, 
and treaties in Somalia. They also participate in insurgent groups and fuel many of their 
rivalries. Because of the supreme role that clans play in everyday life, they have an 
influence on insurgent groups. However, as violent mobile or foreign forces have entered 
the scene, clan elders have found their influence diminished, especially when confronted 
by young militants. 
2. Pastoral Nomadism 
Intimately associated with kinship is the second-most important cultural aspect of 
Somali life, pastoral nomadism. In the 1960s, approximately 80 percent of Somalis were 
seasonally migratory nomads who moved livestock wherever water and grazing was 
available.73 Even today, nomads and semi-pastoralists constitute a significant portion of 
the population, and livestock accounts for about 40 percent of Somalia’s gross domestic 
product (GDP).74 Animals like camels, cattle, sheep, and goats, as well as anything 
associated with their survival, are of vital significance to the Somali people. Conflicts 
often arise due to disputes over grazing and water rights, contributing to clan and sub-
clan feuds. Typically in nomadic settings, might makes right and arbitration is often 
governed or affected by the relative strength of the family or clan. The prevalence of 
nomadism “actively militates against the formation of stable territorial groups,”75 
centralized government, and accepted international borders. 
3. Islam and Ancestral Pride 
Somalis are a proud people—proud of their Arab Islamic ties and of their lineage, 
which is based on belief in an ancestry that traces back to Mohammad.76 Somalia’s 
official religion is Sunni Islam and the population is 99.8 percent Muslim, standing in 
                                                 
73 Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of 
Africa, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 13. 
74 “The World Factbook: Somalia.” U.S. Government Printing Office. Accessed February 18, 2015. 
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stark contrast to Somalia’s neighbors, who are mostly either of the Christian or 
indigenous African faiths.77 The Somalis’ pride in their Islamic heritage has created an 
in-group bias. As a generalization, they see themselves as superior to others—which is 
manifested in an “us versus them” mentality.78 A popular Somali saying illustrates the 
social hierarchy of strife. 
Me and my clan against the world; 
Me and my family against my clan; 
Me and my brother against my family; 
Me against my brother.79 
4. Hostility Toward External Influences 
 Ethiopia is historically Somalia’s most enduring external enemy, as described 
below, but in general, Somalis disdain external influences, especially from non-Muslims. 
This rejection of outside advice can create a difficult environment for stability—and a 
problem only Somalis can solve.  
5. A Global Network 
Stemming in part from Somalia’s strategic location on the sea, the Somali 
diaspora is flung to the far reaches of the globe and yet Somalis remain closely 
connected. Tight interpersonal relationships maintained via cellphone, radio, the Internet, 
travel remittances sent home from abroad, help keep social networks strong and the 
Somali economy afloat. Around the world, Somalis stay apprised of Somali affairs.80 
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6. Opportunism 
The last cultural aspect important for analysis is the extraordinary opportunism of 
the Somali people. Nomadic life and simple survival have necessitated keen skill in 
exploiting possible advantages:  
From within the Somali frame, whenever individuals were able to 
successfully gain goods that could be turned into money (or more goods or 
favors [such as aid shipments, arms, political contributions]), such 
windfalls renewed hope and reaffirmed the importance of being able, even 
staying poised to take advantage of opportunity; expectations could pay 
off.81 
To sum it up in Somali form, “either be a mountain or lean on one.”82 
Understanding these cultural fundamentals, it should not be surprising that the 
two most admired and influential national heroes in Somalia are Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al 
Ghazi and Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. These elements help explain historic events and 
will continue to play an instrumental role in Somalia’s future.  
B. SOMALI HISTORY 
1. Early History 
Evidence from archeological digs in the Horn of Africa suggests the region may 
have been inhabited in prehistoric times. However, the earliest recorded history relating 
to the Horn is found in ancient Egyptian inscriptions referring to the land of Punt or 
Pwenet as an early trading partner. 83 Though there is dispute as to the location of Punt, it 
is believed to cover an area southwest of Egypt, around the Red Sea, which today 
includes Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and the southern Arabian Peninsula.84 The 
salient points are the suggestion of eastern-Arabic influence over a period of millennia 
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and of ancient Somalia as a strategic region, inclined to trade, between the Middle East 
and Africa.  
Arabia and Persia heavily influenced the Horn of Africa, not only via immigrants 
who settled in the region, but also through the spread of religion and culture. In the early 
10th century, traders, explorers, and immigrants, primarily Arabs, began to establish 
coastal settlements, trading posts, and eventually ports and towns along the Indian Ocean 
coast. With trade and cultural influences came a new religion, Islam, which remains a 
fixed part of Somali culture to this day. Beginning with settlements that eventually 
formed a loose federation, local dynastic sultanates arose and enjoyed prosperity until the 
15th century, when they were subdued by pressure from interior nomads who interfered 
with trade.85  
Owing to declining economic trade and a consequent inability to support the 
growing population, the 16th century saw a period of intense unrest.86 A series of wars 
was directed at Ethiopia, as a Somali from the Darod clan, Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al 
Ghazi, gained political power by urging a disparate Islamic-majority population into a 
holy war against Christian Ethiopians to the west.87 Although some consider it an 
obligation within Islam to conquer Christians and spread the teachings of Mohammed, 
the timing makes it clear that the motivation of this “holy war” was political—an effort to 
gain wealth, land, and power to prop up a failing region. Forced conversions were but a 
bonus. With help from the Portuguese in 1543, Ethiopia defeated Ahmed, thus ending the 
threat of Moslem conquest. Since the 16th century, smaller wars between Ethiopia and its 
Moslem neighbors have continued.88 
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2. Middle History 
Local and regional control under Arabic sultanates gave way to foreign 
entanglements and colonial control in the 19th and 20th centuries, as areas of the Horn 
were leased, bought, and divided by European interests.  
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 altered the geopolitical composition of the 
region yet again; by bolstering trade with Europe, India, and the Far East, the shores of 
the Red Sea increased in strategic importance.89 This elevated status attracted European 
colonizers and created new openings for sultans and warlords, who had proven adept 
opportunists over time, to use every change to their political advantage, whether against a 
rival clan or enemy or in pursuit of personal interests. The “scramble for Africa” began, 
and although there were other powers carving up Africa from 1881–1914, Italy, France, 
and Britain were the major colonial powers in the Horn. Ethiopia, the sole independent 
empire in the region, was the only non-colonial power involved in the scramble, and 
Egypt’s withdrawal from the area during this period renewed Ethiopian aspirations for 
the Ogaden region. Local sultans continued to manipulate these foreign powers to 
advance their own interests, leasing and selling parcels of land to the Italians and 
exploiting the British and others in their maneuvers against rivals. 
In 1895, Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan returned to British-controlled 
Somaliland. Also known as the “Mad Mullah,” he complicated affairs among clans, 
colonialists, and Ethiopia for the following two decades.90 Provoked by foreign 
incursions and annoyed at Somalis who rejected his teachings, he led a holy war initially 
directed at moderate Sufi Muslims, but later against Ethiopians and the British as well.91 
The dervish movement was eventually crushed, and the division of Somalia resumed.92, 
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93, 94 “Somalis were divided among five different political entities: Italian Somaliland, 
British Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Ethiopia, and Kenya.”95  
In Somali Nationalism, Saadia Touval explains that “three factors contributed to 
the development of national consciousness among Somalis.”96 The most important was 
resentment against harsh and oppressive colonial governments, followed by religious 
antagonism towards non-Moslem, alien governments and the attempts of outside 
governments to undermine their rivals by encouraging Somali nationalism.97 These 
influences ripened into a political movement at the end of World War II. In 1960, four 
months after the end of the British protectorate, the former British Somaliland united with 
the former Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic.98 
3. Late History 
Like another former colony, Eritrea, Somalia lacked independent, civil-society 
organizations;99 and with its vast majority of nomadic people, the new nation also lacked 
the benefit of real and enduring governmental checks and balances. These inadequacies 
allowed opportunistic, power-hungry leaders to arrogate control and militated against 
progress. The people granted the government leeway in the first flush of independence, as 
a constitution was created, and democracy attempted, but this grace period lasted less 
than a decade. 
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Somali Islamism can be traced back to three 1960s social movement 
organizations: Waxada al-Shabab al Islami (Islamic Youth Unity), Jama’at Ahl al-Islami 
(Al-Ahli), and Munadamat al-Nahdah al Islamiyah (the Organization of Islamic 
Renaissance), all of which were formed to influence Somali politics at this vulnerable and 
impressionable time.100 
Following the assassination of the democratically elected Somali president 
Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1969, Mohamed Siad Barre positioned himself as military 
dictator and president through a bloodless military coup.101 Barre repealed the 
constitution and democracy and replaced many in the government with people loyal to 
his inner circle. Throughout his 21-year reign, Siad Barre used various means to rally or 
distract the Somali people, to include internal clan divisions. He strengthened ties to the 
Arabic world, a region most Somalis identify with affectionately, and secured partnership 
with the Arab League in 1974.  
A few years later, in 1977, confronted with failing policies and falling support, 
Siad Barre invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. War succeeded for a time in 
distracting the Somali people, until the Soviets dropped aid to Somalia and backed 
Ethiopia to victory in 1978. Following defeat and the declining support for the dictator, a 
shakeup and a new constitution were attempted. Two of the most prominent Islamist 
combatant groups (Waxada al-Shabab al Islami and Jama’at Ahl al-Islami) merged and 
formed Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) in 1984. AIAI’s goal was the removal of Siad Barre 
and the establishment of an Islamic state, but Barre used force to maintain power. His 
power declined substantially over the next decade, as he was seen by some to be 
supporting particular clans, which incited clan conflicts and eventually led to civil war. In 
January 1991, Siad Barre was thrown out of power by rival factions. The anarchy and 
lawlessness that ensued from the collapse of the government has continued, partly as a 
result of endless foreign intervention.102  
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A theme has emerged in Somalia: as outside influence comes in to exacerbate 
problems, the political elites receive ample opportunity to plunder. This was clear with 
Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan as well as with Siad Barre. Saadia Touval, in 
Somali Nationalism, summarizes the problem:  
Thus, the present involvement of external powers in the Horn of Africa is 
motivated by their varying interests and also has been encouraged by the 
weaknesses of the territories in the region and their need for political and 
economic support. The involvement of foreign powers in the Horn should 
not be surprising. Yet it is not conducive to peace. It aggravates regional 
tensions.103 
Ultimately, Touval argues, the difficulties in Somalia need to be resolved by 
Somalis. By 1989, many expatriates’ advice for Somalia was to leave Somalis alone for 
twenty years to sort out their own problems.104  
Even at the outset of Operation Restore Hope, there were those who saw 
the final outcome. In December 1992, just before the first U.S. Marines 
landed at Mogadishu, ambassador Smith Hempstone sent the state 
department a cable, entitled  “The Somali Tarbaby,” that proved 
remarkably prescient:  
“Somalis ... are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. They 
will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run attacks.... If you liked 
Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu. To what end? To keep tens of thousands of 
Somali kids from starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will 
starve to death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994)? 
... I have heard estimates ... that it will take five years to get Somalia not 
on its feet but just on its knees.... Finally, what will we leave behind when 
we depart? The Somali is treacherous. The Somali is a killer. The Somali 
is as tough as his country, and just as unforgiving.... We ought to have 
learned by now that these situations are easier to get into than to get out of, 
that no good deed goes unpunished.’ 
The joint staff’s attitude, while never so pungently phrased, was roughly 
the same as Hempstone’s, opposing the decision to carry out a major 
ground intervention in November 1992.105  
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In 1992, Somalia’s political situation once again became intertwined with foreign 
intervention, first by the U.S., then shortly after by the UN, under the rationale of 
humanitarian assistance. “For the United States, the cost came to 32 killed in action, 172 
wounded and $1.3 billion spent through 30 June 1994.”106 By September 1994, “Somalia 
had reverted to a political state not far from the anarchy of 1992.”107  
Under Siad Barre, VEOs never flourished. It was only in the chaos following his 
ouster, and the prolonged civil war that Islamism revived. Many internally-sponsored 
attempts at transitional governments were attempted after the civil war, but none were 
effective. The Islamic courts emerged in this vacuum.  
The first Islamic court was founded as early as 1993 in the capital city of 
Mogadishu.108 By March 2000, there were eleven individual courts and a Sharia 
Implementation Council (SIC) was organized. The courts served to adjudicate intra- and 
inter-clan issues. Chairman Sheikh Ali Dheere led the SIC and Sheikh Hassan Dahir 
Aweys served as secretary general (AIAI military commander). Each individual court 
contributed 80 men to build the court’s military security apparatus. Hassan Dahir Aweys 
took control of the security component.109 As they began to consolidate their reach and 
authority, some opportunistic Somalis in a radical faction of the Islamic courts attempted 
to co-opt the popular movement for their own political ends. They ramped up their 
rhetoric against Ethiopia, which was seen as meddling in Somali politics through their 
active (yet requested) support of the TFG. Though the majority of those in the Islamic 
courts disagreed with the rogue element advocating war, they could not change what 
happened next. 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States, followed 
by the United Nations a month later, branded AIAI a terrorist organization, for its 
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association with Al-Qaeda.110 In a report to Congress, Ted Dagne relayed that many ICU 
and AIAI leaders had grown weary of “old” leaders’ decisions and created a new 
organization in 2003 called Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahedeen.111, 112  
Since Siad Barre’s ouster in 1991, warlords had administered local security in 
many parts of Somalia and crime had spiraled out of control. In 2006, the courts united to 
form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and began to run the warlords out of town.113 In 
response to their decline in power and to resist the growing influence of the ICU, local 
warlords and businessmen formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-
Terrorism (APRCT). The APRCT was soon heavily supported by the CIA. The APRCT 
led the CIA to believe that the ICU was a radical Islamic organization dedicated to 
terrorism.114 In turn, the ICU “started to represent an alternative power system when they 
united to face a common enemy, the U.S.-backed [APRCT].”115 Eventually, members of 
the ICU attacked what they perceived to be the Western-backed, anti-Islamic APRCT and 
Ethiopian-backed TFG.  
Ethiopia, mindful of historical Somali Islamic invasions, joined the new U.S. 
global war on terrorism in yet another entanglement with Somalia. Within six months of 
the ICU’s establishment, and upon the request of the TFG, a U.S.-backed Ethiopian 
invasion took place. The initial goal had been to support the TFG. However, the effort 
quickly shifted towards destroying the ICU and any potential terrorist elements within it. 
In essence, the invasion of 2006 was reminiscent of the colonial interference of the 
1900s. Ethiopia’s TFG-requested intervention was soon used as a recruiting tool for the 
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formation of a new VEO. Foreign interference gave the radical Islamic movement exactly 
what it needed to gain popularity; with this support, the radicals were able to wage a 
protracted campaign against U.S.-backed Ethiopia. This preventable movement was the 
beginning of Al-Shabaab. 
4. Al-Shabaab 
After Ethiopia’s invasion and military routing of the ICU, many of its moderate 
leaders and members fled to neighboring countries. This left behind the radical military 
wing of the ICU, Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, henceforth referred to as “Al-
Shabaab,” which split from the ICU in December 2006 to form its own organization.116 
According to Rob Wise,  
The Ethiopian occupation of Somalia … would fuel the development of al 
Shabaab’s ideology, recruitment, operational strategy, and partnerships, 
transforming the group from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more 
moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed 
faction in the country.117  
On January 8, 2007, for the first time since 2004, the TFG occupied the capital 
city of Mogadishu and, in March, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) 
deployed to Somalia to assist the TFG and protect key infrastructure.118 During this 
occupation Somali volunteers swelled the ranks of Al-Shabaab, which grew in size from 
approximately 400 fighters into the thousands. They were motivated by the nationalist 
narrative that Ethiopians must be driven out of the country. Fighting their way south from 
Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab fighters conquered and held large portions of southern Somalia. 
They would continue to use guerilla tactics to defend and fight the Ethiopian military, the  
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African Union (AU), and TFG forces.119, 120 According to Wise, “following the initial 
invasion, [A]l Shabaab began a campaign of guerrilla raids, bombings, and assassination 
attempts against Ethiopian forces in the southcentral region.”121 Along the way, Al-
Shabaab implemented its version of Sharia law, and nationalism and Islamic ideology 
became its central narrative theme.122 
As Al-Shabaab maintained and held territory in southern Somalia, including  
the key port of Kismayo, it organized basic governmental services, such as policing, 
welfare, and general law and order.123 Al-Shabaab approached the clan system carefully, 
never operating in isolation from clan dynamics and using its intimate knowledge of 
clans to advantage. For instance, it specifically appealed to politically inferior and 
underrepresented clans, who in turn contributed fighters. Additionally, Al-Shabaab 
leveraged the privileged position of men within traditional society and exploited marriage 
conventions to seal alliances.124 Al-Shabaab continues to routinely use the clans to push 
out territorial rivals and maintain influence in key areas.  
Al-Shabaab’s interactions with Al-Qaeda (AQ), which began around 2008, have 
contributed significantly to its formulation of extremist ideology and have brought in 
financial and technical assistance. Al-Shabaab draws on the expertise and technical 
prowess of foreign fighters, and its close ideological ties with AQ have enabled Al-
Shabaab to expand beyond Somalia and improve its tactics, ideology, and strategy.125, 126 
Al-Shabaab’s emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, who fought with AQ in Afghanistan, made 
overtures to AQ through public and private statements increasingly after 2008, signaling 
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a desire to cooperate more closely, especially in the recruitment of foreign fighters, to 
build support for the global jihad.127  
Owing to concerns over Al-Shabaab’s extremist influence in East Africa, the U.S. 
Department of State classified Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization on February 29, 
2008.128 In January 2009, AMISOM Ugandan, Kenyan, Djiboutian, Burundian, and 
Sierra Leone forces remained as peacekeeping forces, even as Ethiopian troops withdrew 
from Mogadishu. On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab conducted its first global terrorist attack, 
killing 74 persons in Kampala, Uganda.129 In August 2010, AMISOM partnered with 
TFG forces to lead a counteroffensive to take back territory from Al-Shabaab; but Al-
Shabaab continued to control significant pockets across south-central Somalia, 
particularly in rural areas. While even today Al-Shabaab continues to maintain the 
tactical initiative through ambushes, IED attacks, and targeted killings, troops loyal to the 
central government have degraded its ability to fight conventionally. The central 
government has attempted reconciliation and amnesty programs with some success, but 
core Al-Shabaab fighters continue to oppose the “illegitimate” government. 
In February 2012, Al-Shabaab officially pledged allegiance to AQ, following a 
four-year-plus courtship, in an effort to gain legitimacy and additional resources and 
strengthen global jihadism.130 According to AQ emir Ayman al Zawahiri, the “jihadi 
movement is growing…despite the fiercest Crusader campaign in history launched by the 
West against Muslims.”131 
Even as Al-Shabaab has lost territory, it has infiltrated all walks and stations of 
Somali life, including some in the TFG.132 The government’s seemingly endless political 
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transitions, pervasive corruption, and instability have afforded political and social 
opportunities for Al-Shabaab to undermine TFG legitimacy. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab’s 
areas of control were further reduced in 2012 by the loss of the critical port city of 
Kismayo, a major source of revenue for the organization. 
Al-Shabaab has refined its approaches and learned from its mistakes. Many of its 
actions were initially unpopular with Somalis, including the strict application of sharia 
law, summary justice, and terrorist attacks, particularly against unarmed civilians. The 
organization’s ability to govern at the local and grassroots level has provided tangible 
benefits in mediating local clan disputes, improving religious education, and 
strengthening local institutions of governance.133  
Since the American intervention (Operation RESTORE HOPE) in 1992, the U.S. 
has taken a limited military approach to combatting Al-Shabaab. The strategy is primarily 
based on gathering actionable intelligence and carrying out lethal targeting of Al-Shabaab 
leaders, planners, and organizers through drone strikes and special-operations raids. 
While several senior leaders have been killed (most recently Ahmed Godane in 2014), 
Al-Shabaab has shown resilience to lethal targeting, quickly replacing commanders and 
identifying informants who supply actionable intelligence. Ultimately, Al-Shabaab 
remains a problem.  
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IV. PHASE ONE: CONTEXT APPLICATION 
“A stitch in time saves nine,” runs the adage. The meaning is simple: when you 
find a fault, mend it early, before the damage grows. This chapter explores whether a 
similar logic might apply to VEOs. Is the U.S. missing opportunities to defuse threats 
before they come to a head? Historical and cultural context is often overlooked in foreign 
policy decisions, which favor a shortsighted focus on the present. The resulting lack of 
context has at times sabotaged not only the U.S., but all parties involved. Context cannot 
be overemphasized as the foundation for decision making; in particular, a grasp of 
context will likely produce superior results in deterrence, where knowing what binds and 
divides a population is critical in calculating costs and benefits and evaluating the 
feasibility of solutions.  
In Chapter III, we examined important features of Somalia’s culture and history to 
trace the conditions that led to the rise of Al-Shabaab as indicated in Figure 8. 
Conducting a historical and cultural survey invariably yields insights; and at Phase One, 
it is the only thing we have to work with to determine whether anything could have been 
done to deter Al-Shabaab from ever forming.  




It must be noted that there are vital prerequisites to deterrence. At minimum, 
deterrence requires commitment and an understanding of the enemy’s ordered 
preferences. Therefore, before deterrence can be applied at any phase of the EGP, the 
level of commitment must be thoroughly understood by all actors.  
To apply deterrence theory, we make the assumption that U.S. foreign policy 
reflects an understanding of clearly defined vital national interests. However, even with 
the benefit of this supposition, if applied at this early phase deterrence faces some 
difficulties. There are four primary difficulties we foresee in using deterrence at Phase 
One of the evolutionary growth process. 
1. Problems in Phase-One Deterrence 
The first problem is that deterrence requires foresight, and problems that 
potentially could be deterred simply have not materialized to the point of visibility or 
interest. Yet, a general, vague deterrence is expensive and often ineffective against 
specific threats, like setting a mouse trap without the incentive of bait. The bait—or the 
piece of deterrence that makes it effective—must be chosen based on the ordered 
preferences of the adversary. Foresight is required to see problems brewing and analyze 
the context of each situation before making calculations—or potentially grave 
miscalculations.  
The second issue is not with deterrence per se, but the confusion of deterrence 
with pre-emption. In the case of Al-Shabaab, the U.S.’s pre-emptive effort to back 
Ethiopia and remove the ICU before it became a problem actually created the problem 
the U.S. wished to prevent.134, 135 
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Third, it is difficult to know whether a deterrent succeeded in this phase. This is a 
practical problem, if something never happens; it is difficult to know whether a deterrent 
had any effect whatsoever.136 The potential to inadvertently deter good and necessary 
changes is the last difficulty in Phase One. Because the U.S. most often deals with 
problems in weak, unstable regions, attempts to deter bad things from happening may 
have the consequence of preventing necessary changes from occurring. The unforeseen 
outcomes of deterrence may regrettably contribute to continued instability. Once again, 
any real-life evidence would be nearly impossible to quantify or neatly test; the best that 
can be done is simply to be aware of these problems while exploring solutions.137 
2. Costs and Benefits 
The two primary components of the deterrence equation are costs and benefits: for 
the target, the cost of carrying out a plan needs to outweigh the benefits for deterrence to 
be effective. Another way to evaluate the costs–benefits relationship is to reduce or 
eliminate the benefits, which in turn would reduce or eliminate the costs necessary to 
deter them. At Phase One, in which there is no specific entity to deter, we look at the 
historical and cultural context of the region for projected costs–benefits analysis of 
potential threats and likely responses. Context provides a more accurate picture not only 
of potential threats to the population, but also the population’s likely response.   
Current U.S. policy appears to obsess over the costs side of the deterrence 
equation, when denying benefits or opportunity may be more important. For example, in 
Somalia, threats lead to change, change leads to opportunity, and opportunity, as we have 
seen, can lead to a VEO. Thus, one way to deter VEO formation is to prevent change. If a 
VEO is not a congealed movement or organization at this early phase, then preventing 
change necessarily prevents its from becoming so. To prevent change, the population 
needs to be contented or distracted. In a scenario where the population is content—basic 
needs are met, the people have a way to voice their grievances, and get them addressed, 
                                                 
136 Vesna Danilovic, “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June, 2001): 341–369. 
137 Such general deterrence scenarios are notoriously difficult to test adequately. See Robert Jervis 
“Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence.” World Politics 41, no. 2 (January, 1989): 183–207. 
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and clans and individuals feel fairly well represented—in all likelihood change will not 
occur and VEOs will not emerge.  
Mastering historical and cultural context may allow the U.S. to see not only the 
characteristics that lead to change, but also where solutions might come from. In Somalia, 
flashpoint issues have included:  
 social and economic problems 
 non-representative government incapable of arbitrating fairly and fulfilling 
basic functions 
 military invasion 
 foreign interference, especially by Ethiopia and non-Muslim nations. 
No outside solution has ever been accepted in Somalia over the long term.  
“Good” deterrence in this phase might be to strengthen a healthy and popular 
governmental system or not interfere at all. However, U.S. if we look at U.S. foreign 
policy in Somalia in 2006 what do we see? A foreign, infidel country (Ethiopia), 
intervening to prop up a government that had failed the people and, at the same time, 
rejected a solution that was derived from the people (ICU). If Ethiopia and U.S. had not 
intervened, the best outcome may have been that Somalis solved their own problems; the 
worst would have been deterioration into the chaos currently faced today, but without 
U.S. and Ethiopian costs incurred and no one but Somalis themselves to blame.  
However, in cases when intervention is deemed necessary during this phase of the 
EGP, based on predefined vital national interests, deterrence strategy must take into 
account context and should focus on deterring threats to the population. By this means, 
the population does not become aggrieved, therefore preventing phases one and two from 
coming to pass, and ultimately, the VEO from ever existing.  
If the U.S. had prevented the Ethiopian invasion, co-opted the popular ICU 
movement, and empowered the moderate majority, a different outcome might well have 
occurred. Alternatively, the U.S. might have prevented an invasion and helped the TFG 
to co-opt or formalize the popular ICU instead of trying to destroy it; this could have 
breathed life into the TFG and looked like a Somali only internal solution. Regardless of 
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when actions are taken in Phase One, or during any phase, for that matter, they must be 
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V. PHASE TWO: SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
APPLICATION 
This chapter applies social-movement theory (SMT) to Phase Two of the EGP 
model illustrated in Figure 9. Al-Shabaab is not normally considered a “social 
movement,” but it behaved like one in growing to be the robust terrorist organization 
observed today. Our approach exploits this neglected aspect of the group’s dynamics. 
Phase Two emerges from the latent conditions explained in Chapter III, beginning with a 
grievance that spreads into a movement bent on altering the phase-one environment. The 
key in Phase Two is to limit the potential of a social movement developing into a VEO. 
Figure 9.  Phase Two of the EGP 
 
First, Islamic social movements are categorized according to ideological goals to 
assist strategists in selecting and co-opting moderate social movements and deterring or 
neutralizing radical movements. Next, we categorize the Islamic social movements 
specific to Somalia, distinguishing political from Salafi-jihadi organizations. Third, we 
use the PPM to explain factors leading to Al-Shabaab’s development, suggesting where 
and how to apply deterrence in Phase Two. Finally, we summarize insights in order to 
better understand Al-Shabaab and Somali VEOs in general.  
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A. TYPES OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Islamic social movements are categorized as missionary, political, and radical 
(Salafi-jihadi).138 Missionary social movements work for the spread of Islam and avoid 
politics—for that reason, they are not described here (for discussion, see Guide to 
Islamist Movements, edited by Barry Rubin).139 Rather, this research focuses on the 
political and radical Salafi-jihadis. Political Islamic organizations focus on governance 
and rule of law according to Islamic doctrine. By contrast, the fundamental Salafi-jihadi 
purpose is to radically remake the fabric of society, via terror and the implementation of 
strict sharia law.  
Sociologists use many typologies, variables, measures, and indicators to catalog 
social-movement goals. One notion, proposed by David Aberle, is based on a study of the 
Navajo of the southwestern United States, in which he categorizes social movements 
based on their predominant ideological rationales for change and offers the typologies of 
alternative, redemptive, reformative, and revolutionary.140  
 Alternative movements develop with the principle goal of partially 
changing a people’s cultural values (e.g., NewEnergyMovement.org).  
 Redemptive movements seek a total change in individual behavior (e.g., 
Alcoholics Anonymous).  
 Reformative movements pursue a partial change in society to remedy 
social injustices or inequalities (e.g., the NAACP).  
 Revolutionary movements, the focus of this research, seek a total 
structural transformation of society (e.g., Al-Shabaab).  
B. SOMALIA ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS 
The primary political organizations in Somalia are Harakat al Islah (AI), Ahl al-
Sunna wal-Jam’a (ASWJ), and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya (MUIS). All 
adhere to a somewhat moderate version of Islam, as compared to the radical Salafi-
                                                 
138 Merriam-Webster defines a jihad as, “a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; 
also: a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline, a crusade for a 
principle or belief.” 
139 Barry Rubin, ed. Guide to Islamist Movements, Vol. 1, New York: M.E. Sharp, 2010, 24–26. 
140 Simone Flynn, “Types of Social Movements,” Sociology Reference Guide (2009), 26–31. 
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jihadis. These groups’ focus varies from providing basic social functions, such as 
weddings, religious instruction and education, to humanitarian services, social promotion, 
and denouncement of radicalism.141  
Al-Islah’s primary focus over time has been humanitarian aid, educational 
offerings, social promotion, and denouncing the more “radical” movements. ASWJ, was 
specifically founded to counter radical jihadi trends and focus more on moderate Sufi-
Islam. For example, “ASWJ has taken up the role of monitoring the rise of extremism in 
central Somalia; the group has closed several mosques after accusing clerics of being too 
extreme.”142 Additionally, Sheikh Omar Mohamed Farah, a leader in the group, has 
explained that, “we are fighting in the name of God to eliminate those who are 
propagating a misinterpretation of this religion in the country.”143 The third of the 
moderate groups, MUIS, is led by Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Dhi’isow. Its primary function is 
to conduct basic social functions such as weddings and religious education. MUIS’s 
political goal is to rule Somalia based on the Shafi’i school of sharia law.144 These three 
moderate Islamic organizations fill a critical role in mobilizing youth and provide an 
alternative to Salafi-jihadi organizations. 
Salafi-jihadi organizations, in contrast, survive on a commitment to violence and 
revolutionary Islamist goals. This is especially true for the movement known as Jamaaca 
Islaamiya (JI). Stig Hansen traces this particular organization’s roots to Somali students 
who returned from Saudi Arabia heavily influenced by Wahhabi preaching, which 
teaches a literal interpretation of Islam dating back to the 18th century and focuses on  
 
                                                 
141 Rubin, Guide to Islamist Movements, 24–26. 
142 Stanford.edu, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Ahlu Al-Sunna Wal Jam’a,” Stanford University, 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/109Aug 15, 2015). 
143 “Somalia-Security Ahlu Al-Sunna Wal Jama’a, Somali’s Sufi Defense Force. “International News 
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jamaa-somalias-sufi-defence-force&catid=41:somalia-security&Itemid=100249 (accessed September 14, 
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144 Rubin, Guide to Islamist Movements, 24–26. 
 50
“the jihad of self-sacrifice.” 145, 146 A second radical group is al-Itihaad al-Islamiya 
(AIAI). AIAI is believed to be a Wahhabi nationalist movement.147 AIAI and JI share a 
dramatic goal, as is typical of these social movements, namely, to transform Somalia into 
a caliphate under strict sharia law.148  
C. SOCIAL-MOVEMENT THEORY 
This section uses the PPM from social movement theory to explain the factors 
leading to Al-Shabaab’s development, suggesting where and how to apply deterrence in 
Phase Two. Figure 10 fits Adam’s PPM to Al-Shabaab. Although social movements have 
myriad goals, they vie for finite resources (supporters, money, and information) and stem 
from some type of systemic societal strain (the cause) followed by the society’s rise (the 
effect) against the status quo (emergence). 
Figure 10.  The Political-Process Model as Applied to Al-Shabaab  
 
Adapted from: McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 
1930–1970 (Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
                                                 
145 Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 
2005–2012Oxford University Press, 2013), 15–16. 
146 Abdi O. Dr Shuriye, “Al-Shabaab’s Leadership Hierarchy and its Ideology,” Academic Research 
International 2, no. 1 (2012), 280.          
147 Stanford.edu, “Mapping Militant Organizations: Al Ittihad Al Islamiya.” 
148 Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 
2005–2012Oxford University Press, 2013), 20. 
 51
1. Broad Socioeconomic Processes  
In the case of Al-Shabaab, dissatisfaction with political, economic, and social 
conditions aroused a widespread sense of injustice, motivating people to reject the status 
quo, or what McAdam refers to as the “broad socioeconomic process.” Social movements 
develop as a confluence of connected events dispersed geographically and aggregated 
over time.149 For example, in 2001, the UN reported that the Somali people had 
experienced years of civil war, a national identity crisis, contested governance, civilians 
as the target of violence, extreme poverty, violation of human rights, famine, social 
injustice, and accumulation of wealth by the elite. Furthermore, the economic outlook 
was bleak, with persistent unemployment.150 Assistance from outside Somalia was 
reported to disturb the country more than stabilize it.151 Additionally, Siad Barre’s 
polices helped galvanize Somali youth, creating a pool for Islamic recruitment. 
Responding to these broad socioeconomic conditions, many social movements arose to 
agitate or assist the people.  
2. Political Opportunity 
Political opportunity occurs when an opportunistic challenger is able to rally 
supporters for political views in opposition to the incumbent government. As an example, 
Iqbal Jhazbhay contends that the “U.S. has helped create a political situation in which 
extremists such as the Somali insurgent group Al-Shabaab and the Taliban in Afghanistan 
have become legitimate political players.”152 Essentially, as clan warlords took advantage 
of U.S. support to further their political interests,153 the people’s mistrust of governance, 
suspicions among the political elite, and the resentment over intervention, and ambitious 
clans created opportunity for Al-Shabaab to fill the political void. 
                                                 
149 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 40. 
150 United Nations Development Program, Somalia Human Development Report 2001, United 
Nations, (2001). 
151 Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 
2005–2012 Oxford University Press, 2013), 5–6, 20–21, 34. 
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3. Indigenous Organizational Strength  
Indigenous organizational strength is the ability of a social movement to leverage 
a local community’s resources to achieve collective action. This “conversion potential” 
essentially means converting portions of the aggrieved population into an active  
protest movement. Al-Shabaab’s conversion potential was realized by linking several 
groups of like-minded individuals into a more radicalized social movement.154 
Conversion potential can be further labeled as mobilization, which is a function of four 
critical factors: membership, communication-network infrastructure, incentives, and 
leadership.155  
a. Membership 
The PPM suggests that, “movement participants (members) are recruited along 
established lines of interaction.”156 For Al-Shabaab, these linkages include clan relatives, 
colleagues, personal friends, clerics, and veterans. Members join Al-Shabaab for 
excitement, and, above all, for friendship with like-minded individuals. Social scientists 
refer to this principle as “homophily,” as found in the saying, “birds of a feather flock 
together.”157 Essentially, individuals and clans are more likely to influence other 
individuals and clan members who share similar characteristics and behaviors. 
Demographic data shows that unemployed, dissociated, socially alienated, unmarried 
young men and widowed women join terrorist organizations seeking challenges, 
excitement, and above all homophily.158 
b. Communication-Network Infrastructure 
Al-Shabaab uses established clan organizations (that is, a communication-network 
infrastructure) as a basis from which to recruit members. Al-Shabaab leaders used 
                                                 
154 Dirk Baehr, “The Somali Shabaab Militias and their Jihadist Networks in the West,” KAS 
International Reports (August, 2011), 30. 
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Social Networks.” Annual Review of Sociology, (2001): 415–444. 
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linkages between members of AIAI, ICU, and core Afghanistan veterans essentially fuse 
a large group of radical with a disgruntled Hawiye sub-clan the Haber-Gedir. Al-Shabaab 
was initially perceived as belonging to the Hawiye clan, because of its hostility toward 
the TFG, which was seen as Darood (different clan). Pro- and anti-clan rhetoric 
motivated many to join the movement.159 According to Hansen, the “young Al-Shabaab 
was seen as a counterweight to the influence of the perceived Ethiopian-supported 
Majeerteen-Rahanwhein [clan] alliance.”160 Furthermore, the horizontal ties that linked 
individuals and groups across geographic, ideological, and social boundaries were 
another reason to join.161 Interestingly, although Somalis self-identify proudly as being 
from specific clans, may also blame the clans for violence and the destruction of 
stability.162  
Al-Shabaab is held together thanks to a variety of legacy affiliations with previous 
organizations, clan loyalties, and Afghanistan war veterans. Al-Shabaab was assumed to 
transcend clan lines but in reality, it took advantage of the clan system by using existing 
clan structures and communication networks to pursue its political objectives. 
c. Incentives 
The third aspect of mobilization comes in the form of rewards (incentives)—
interpersonal rewards for participation in the social movement. Due to astronomical 
unemployment in Somalia, many recruits join Al-Shabaab for financial rewards. The 
2012 United Nations Development report estimates unemployment among all Somalis at 
54 percent. Among 14- to 29-year-old males—a key demographic for Al-Shabaab 
recruitment—unemployment is a staggering 67 percent.163 Al-Shabaab has an estimated 
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annual revenue in excess of $70 million and pays its members exceedingly well.164 
Gerald Andae estimates salaries equivalent to $500 monthly.165 Non-material incentives 
are religious motivation and association with the organization’s brand—some researchers 
observe that the “coolness” factor is a draw.166 These incentives are meant to stimulate 
involvement in the global jihad.  
d. Leadership 
The final aspect critical to collective action is leadership. Successful organizations 
employ leaders who exhibit boundary-spanning qualities, bridging the gap between an 
organization’s external environment and internal organizationally required resources.167 
For operational leaders to produce results and maintain respect from subordinates and 
superiors, they must understand the system they command. This faculty was evident 
among early leaders of Al-Shabaab, who developed keen awareness during their 
experience as senior members of AIAI and the ICU.168  
4. Cognitive Liberation  
The final characteristic of the PPM is cognitive liberation—often referred to as 
framing. Cognitive liberation requires a message or narrative that resonates with an 
aggrieved population. This narrative should be credible and salient. Cognitive liberation 
should originate from trusted actors who can elicit collective action. The message should 
not resonate with the aggrieved population only, but be acknowledged by the whole 
society.169 Before a movement emerges, cognitive liberation takes place when people 
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perceive their situation (e.g., financial, political, or social) to be unreasonable or unfair 
and believe they can alter it through collective action. A good narrative includes 
diagnostic, prognostic, and action-mobilization frames.170  
It was imperative that Al-Shabaab establish an us-versus-them theme, 
specifically, that Al-Shabaab was “part of the global war between Western powers and 
Islam.”171 Al-Shabaab also needed to ground its message in Somali problems. The 
narrative was cobbled together by leveraging elements of Islam, images from the 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine that depicted Islam as the real target of 
Western attack.172 Moreover, according to Al-Shabaab, the Ethiopians were led by 
“Christians” supported by United States crusaders and that these infidels were allied with 
TFG officials.173 Al-Shabaab used the perception of political segregation, outside 
aggressors, and clan dynamics to vilify the TFG, indicating it was to blame for Somalia’s 
internal problems. 
Al-Shabaab’s narrative also suggested that the exclusion of Hawyie clan members 
from senior political positions was intentional. Based more on perception than reality, 
Hawyie clan leaders believed that the TFG was dominated by the Darood and 
Rahanweyn clans. Members of Hawyie’s Haber-Gedir sub-clan believed the only option 
was to join forces with Al-Shabaab and expel the TFG leaders and Ethiopian and Western 
security forces. Al-Shabaab simultaneously boasted that it was the only entity creating 
jobs, something the apostate TFG was not doing. Al-Shabaab used every opportunity to 
vilify the TFG for lack of regional security—and to crow that by joining Al-Shabaab, 
Somalis would rid Somalia of apostates and crusaders. The message for youth was one of 
idealized martyrdom: if you join Al-Shabaab, you will be a hero.174  
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A summary of the Political Process Model is located in Table 2. 
Table 2.   PPM Specific to Al-Shabaab, Summarized 
 
Adopted from, Doowan Lee DA3800 Social Revolution and Unconventional Warfare 
D. DETERRENCE 
A deterrence strategy requires that values be understood, credibility be 
established, and that effective warning and clear communication be implicit within the 
threat. Max Abrahams, in “What Terrorists Really Want,” argues that current strategies to 
reduce the political usefulness of terrorism will not reduce terrorist behavior. People are 
assumed to participate in terrorist organizations because they are dedicated to achieving 
the organization’s political goals. Moreover, many social scientists suggest people join 
terrorist organizations primarily for social solidarity, and will act to preserve the 
organization’s existence, even if terror acts undermines the organization.175  
Homophily is strong in Al-Shabaab’s clan, sub-clan, and diaspora networks. For 
example, twenty-three Twin City Somalis joined Al-Shabaab to fight the TFG. All 
attended the same high school and college, at the same time. Moreover, they all joined 
                                                 
175 Abrahams, What Terrorists Really Want, 86–89. 
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Al-Shabaab.176 It is suspected that all these men attended the same Abubakar As-
Saddique mosque as well.  
One way deterrence can be applied to the case of homophily is via counter-
narratives.177 In the case of Al-Shabaab, the TFG should leverage information campaigns 
that vilifies Al-Shabaab and makes joining radical social movements such as Al-Shabaab 
taboo and uncool. Nina Tannenwald observes that a taboo has two elements: “its 
objective characteristics and its intersubjective, phenomenological aspect that is the 
meaning it has for people.”178 This concept can be overlaid on joining or participating in 
radical social movements. First, it should be made clear that Al-Shabaab is the real cause 
of social unrest, insecurity, financial problems, and outsiders meddling in Somalia. 
Second, the prognosis should be communicated that participation in Al-Shabaab is 
illegal, dangerous, and potentially deadly. Third, messaging should focus on the people of 
Somalia, asserting that Al-Shabaab is not a national movement, its agenda is not in line 
with Islam, and it does not have Somalia’s best interests in mind. It should be explained 
that the only way outside actors such as Ethiopia and African Union (AU) peacekeepers 
will vacate Somalia is through a peaceful political settlement, and that they would not be 
in Somalia if it were not for Al-Shabaab. The TFG should also heap opprobrium and 
dishonor on those individuals labeled “terrorists,” consistent with Tannenwald’s 
observation that taboos become institutionalized over time.179 This is a process that takes 
time. An additional challenge is that the fledgling TFG is already viewed as 
untrustworthy by many Somalis.  
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VI. PHASE THREE: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
APPLICATION 
This chapter applies the contingency theory from organizational design, based 
primarily on the research of Mintzberg and Daft. We are treating Al-Shabaab as an open 
system, a set of interrelated and interdependent parts arranged to accomplish a mission or 
purpose as depicted in Figure 11.  
Figure 11.  Phase Three of the EGP 
 
A. OPEN SYSTEMS 
As discussed in Chapter II, an open system consists of interdependent parts such 
as boundary, mission and operative goals, inputs, internal transformation processes, 
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Table 3.   Al-Shabaab as an Open-System, Summarized 
 
Al-Shabaab is an adaptable social organism that blends pragmatism and political 
acumen to stay alive, even in the face of battlefield setbacks and internal divisions.181 
Understanding that Al-Shabaab and every other VEO operates within an open system can 
yield macro-level options for their defeat, we focus on aspects of the open system where 
deterrence is applicable: specifically, inputs, outputs, the environment, and feedback, as 
identified in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Al-Shabaab Depicted in the Open-Systems Model 
 
Adopted from: David P. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance 
(Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1988), 18. 
Al-Shabaab’s inputs are the materials and energy it receives from the Somali 
environment and requires for survival. These inputs include recruits to act as foot 
soldiers, and intelligence, which comes by way of the local villages. Financial support 
comes from the practice of zakat and sadaqah, which is used to fund terrorist 
operations.182 Additional funding comes from the charcoal trade, port export taxes, and 
kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) operations.183 Without these valuable resources, Al-Shabaab 
would wither.184  
Outputs are what Al-Shabaab exports back into the environment with the 
expectation of achieving its overall mission. These outputs come in the form of 
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committed, trained jihadists who carry out the murder of government officials, foreigners, 
journalists, and humanitarian workers, as well as kidnappings and terrorist attacks 
throughout Somalia. Moreover, Al-Shabaab conducts civil activities through its 
humanitarian coordination office (HCO), including dissemination of aid and monitoring, 
regulating, registering, and taxing foreign-aid agencies.185 These outputs are what Al-
Shabaab believes will help attain its goal of establishing the Islamic State of Somalia, 
sharia law, and the elimination of foreign influence. 
For Al-Shabaab to continue operating, it must interface with the environment and 
compete against others for survival. By definition, all elements outside Al-Shabaab have 
the potential to affect the organization.186 This includes the physical environment, third-
party supporters, competitors, and opposition, which are all central to the organization’s 
survival or demise. The physical environment is demarcated as the country of Somalia 
and the main location where Al-Shabaab operates.187 Third-party supporters include 
Somali clans, the diaspora, foreign fighters, and Al-Qaeda.188 189 Al-Qaeda’s leader, 
Ayman al Zawahiri, claimed Al-Shabaab was a branch of Al-Qaeda in June 2008.190 
Competitors include other social movements, such as Harakat al Islah, Ahl al-Sunna wal-
Jam’a, and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya, as well as the Somali government. 
Opposition groups include the TFG, the U.S., AMISOM, Kenya, and Ethiopia.191  
Feedback is response received from the environment, providing information 
needed to assess whether the organization is on target with its operational goals. Leaders 
use feedback to alter inputs. This feedback compares Al-Shabaab’s purpose to its 
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environmental needs (which explains why the organization has changed its rhetoric, 
leadership, and operations over time) morphing and adjusting as appropriate and 
adjusting its structure, internal processes, outputs, and response to feedback to avoid 
entropy.192 According to S. V. Raghaven, “[Al-Shabaab] terrorists have shown 
extraordinary intelligence by adapting business concepts like creating interchangeable 
missions, redefining organizational structures and formatting strategic alliances to run 
their organizations efficiently.”193 
B. STRUCTURE 
Al-Shabaab uses vertical linkages to coordinate activities from the top of the 
organization to the bottom. In the hierarchy shown in Figure 13, the reporting 
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Figure 13.  Al-Shabaab’s Hierarchy 
 
Abdi Shuriye suggests as a structural arrangement of leadership, “Al-Shabaab is 
well organized with independent components.”194 Al-Shabaab’s current leader is emir 
Ahmed Diriye Abu Ubaidah, who exercises overall command responsibility for the 
organization and balances power between functional and regional commanders.195 He is 
supported by a ten-member leadership council, or shura, but can overrule their decrees if 
necessary.196 In addition to the shura is an executive council, or cabinet. This executive 
body is responsible for traditional functions such as media relations, military operations, 
and politics. Its purpose is coordination among commanders.197 Equal in authority with 
day-to-day executive leaders are the regional commanders, who are permitted to execute 
area operations as they see fit.  
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There are also special teams within the organization, such as the Amniyat, 
sometimes referred to as Amniyaad. The Amniyat chain of command is denoted by the 
dashed line in Figure 14.  
Figure 14.  Al-Shabaab’s Hierarchy 
 
The Amniyat, which is Shabaab’s secret service, is a cross-functional team 
consisting of specially selected and highly trained loyal individuals who report directly to 
the emir. Amniyat is responsible for protecting its core leadership, carrying out 
assassinations, gathering intelligence, cross-border bombing missions, and integrating 
regional commanders to withstand dissolution of the group. According to Matt Bryden, 
“The Amniyaad has been developing the experience and skills necessary to wage a long 
campaign of assassination, intimidation, and terrorist attacks behind enemy lines—
especially in the major towns.”198 The UN monitoring group considers the Amniyat as 
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Al-Shabaab’s secret service, “which is structured along the lines of a clandestine 
organization within the organization, with the intention of surviving any kind of 
dissolution of Al-Shabaab.”199 
In our view, Al-Shabaab is an amalgam of Daft’s matrix structure and 
Mintzberg’s missionary organization, meeting the three conditions of a matrix 
configuration as denoted in Figure 15. 
Figure 15.  Al-Shabaab’s Missionary Matrix Organization 
 
Al-Shabaab has scarce resources shared across geographical regions and is 
moderately sized, suggesting each regional command lacks enough members to assign 
them full-time functional positions.  
1. Second, regional commanders have equal authority with functional 
commanders. The emir has decentralized Al-Shabaab to allow each 
regional commander responsibility for his area and authority to pursue 
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independent action without shura guidance. 200 This creates two bosses for 
many members of Al-Shabaab, but also decentralizes decisions, making 
the organization difficult to monitor and target.  
2. The environment is both complex and uncertain, which creates a variety of 
influences and requirements for Al-Shabaab.201 
A missionary organization is more than a sum of people, functions, and mission. 
The centrality of ideology to the terrorist organization such as Al-Shabaab is as important 
is it is complex. The integrating factor in the case of Al-Shabaab is Wahhabism,202 which 
focuses on the jihad of self-sacrifice.203 In pursuing its jihad of establishing an Islamic 
State of Somalia, under sharia law, and eliminating foreign influence,204 Al-Shabaab 
exploits member’s commitment to further their collective cause through martyrdom.  
C. DETERRENCE 
Because the open-systems model is applicable to many organizations, we view the 
model as a kind of macro organizational-design lens.  
1. Macro-Level Strategies 
Because the open-systems model as applied to organizations was developed as a 
holistic approach to determining organizational effectiveness, numerous facets of the 
model can be reverse engineered and re-armed to help in the destruction of an 
organization. We concentrate on inputs, outputs, environment, and feedback because they 
provide the most readily accessible avenues of substantial change. 
Of these four facets, inputs such as population, intelligence, and resources (e.g., 
financial or weapons) may present the richest targets for deterrence strategies. For 
instance, many youth in Somalia are out of a job, and Al-Shabaab promises regular 
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pay.205 One indirect method to consider is Paul Kapur’s strategy of punishing the “third-
party” to deter financiers, weapons suppliers, and sympathizers, rather than target the 
elusive terrorists themselves.206 A good place to start is with the smuggling rings of 
southern Somalia, specifically, the illicit sugar and charcoal trades that fund Al-Shabaab 
operations. Tom Keatinge advises, “To take out Al-Shabaab, one need look no further 
than charcoal.”207  
Financial inputs fuel an organization, but the lifeblood is the people. Without 
finances, a popular contextual message, or a mission, there are no recruits; without 
recruits, no intelligence, work, outputs, innovation, growth, and certainly no long-term 
survival or relevance. VEOs require multiple monetary inputs; without them, the 
organization dies.  
As a VEO, Al-Shabaab relies on inputs from the environment and transforms 
them into outputs or operations needed for organizational survival (e.g., KFRs, IEDs, and 
ambushes). VEO outputs vary drastically. Owing mostly to lack of power and control, a 
primary output is terrorism, with the goal of redressing grievances, messaging, 
deterrence, and gaining additional inputs in the form of funding (by kidnapping, piracy, 
killing competitors, robbery, and building notoriety and influence). However, successful 
VEOs also have public-service outputs.208 As Juan Castillo points out, violent terrorist 
organizations use non-kinetic principles and tactics that effect civilian populations for the 
purpose of eroding state power.209, 210 These outputs, such as building roads, schools, and 
institutions of justice, as well as providing basic needs and services, can help immensely. 
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They can also hurt a VEO if it fails to live up to its promises. In essence, VEOs are often 
competing with the government for control, legitimacy, and support of the population. 
Therefore, it is important to highlight their civil service failures along with their 
lawlessness and brutality. 
It thus makes sense to consider a psychological operations (PsyOps) approach. 
The current psychological approach towards Al-Shabaab and similar VEOs seems to be 
aimed at convincing the population, typically without context, that the VEO is bad or 
wrong. The hope is that highlighting negative outputs will deter supporters and new 
recruits. There are two problems with this approach. The first is a lack of sufficient 
contextual knowledge and, in some embarrassing cases, ignorance of the local language. 
Obviously PsyOps in the wrong language is a problem. But so are contextual misfires. 
The second issue is that a superior alternative is not typically provided. A corrupt TFG 
backed by every competing neighbor and international entity that fails to deliver basic 
services is not an acceptable alternative from the Somali perspective. 
Deterrence depends on the rational choices of actors making logical decisions to 
maximize self-interest.211 However, as Thomas Payne comments, “all too frequently, the 
assumption that challengers will behave rationally, which typically they do, at least in a 
limited sense, leads to an expectation that they will also behave reasonably, which often 
they do not.”212 The distinction between rationality and reasonableness is important. 
Potential VEO recruits, supporters, and active members who typically make rational 
decisions on a routine basis in daily life may make unreasonable decisions as to whether 
to stay or join, regardless of the logic. For example, it may be rational to further one’s 
survival by signing on with Al-Shabaab for money; it is not reasonable to believe that 
such an occupation is conducive to a long and satisfactory life or that a terrorist 
organization that enforces its will through horrific behavior today will offer wise and 
peaceful governance tomorrow. 
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Castillo notes, “Therefore, the objective of the PsyOp campaign would be to 
spread information, which influences sentiment against the violent Al-Shabaab 
organization (but also provides a better alternative).”213 For example, Islamist radicals 
use religion to justify their actions. Co-opting non-radical clerics to deliver moderate 
fatwas to their followers will isolate radicals, making it more difficult for Al-Shabaab to 
succeed, due to loss of local support. The Somali government might sponsor commercials 
on television and radio and offer small rewards, coinciding with the release of moderate 
fatwas, that starve VEO popular support. However, care must be taken not to make it an 
“anti-Islamic” campaign, but rather, a campaign against those who hurt Somalia. 
Environment and feedback are tied to each other and relate closely to the inputs 
and outputs of an organization. Since, by definition, the environment includes all 
elements outside the organizational boundary that may affect the organization, the TFG, 
al-Qaida, the U.S., the diaspora, clans, and the economy are all part of the environment. 
Understanding these aspects of the environment, a valid deterrence strategy would co-opt 
or support competition and opposition to deter supporters.    
Feedback is the result of a combination of output, environment, and stakeholders, 
who, in this case, are the population. Affecting change through feedback is not a quick 
process, but by changing the environment and how VEO outputs are perceived, an 
organization learns either to maintain its outputs or change them. An organization must 
change in response to feedback or its survival is in jeopardy. Therefore, changing the 
population’s perception of VEOs will eventually force these organizations towards less 
violence or their demise. 
2. Micro-Level Strategies 
Organizational structure varies from one organization to the next, based on its 
mission and operational environment. Therefore, any insights specific to Al-Shabaab’s 
structure will likely only apply to similarly structured organizations. Since Al-Shabaab 
represents a radical Islamic VEO operating within a weak or failed state, the structural 
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insights derived may also be applied to similar VEOs, provided the mission and 
environment are similar. 
Al-Shabaab appears to use a hybrid combination of the matrix and missionary 
forms of organizational structure. Within the matrix structure, middle-line management is 
the key that allows for simultaneous coordination vertically and horizontally, focusing on 
both outputs and organizational functions. Al-Shabaab is structured in such a way that 
removing middle-line management or important regional or functional commanders will 
severely disrupt and potentially destroy the organization.  
At the forefront of current U.S. targeting policy is killing top-level leadership—
what deterrence theorists would call “deterrence by punishment” and what would say are 
the costs side of the deterrence equation. As one CIA report states, “the terrorist 
leadership provides the overall direction and strategy that links all these factors and 
thereby breathes life into a terror campaign … the loss of the leadership can cause any 
organization to collapse.”214 To explore the effectiveness of this kind of direct action 
endorsed by the CIA, we examined the assignation of four of Al-Shabaab’s top leaders, 
Aden Hashi Ayro, Saleh Naban, Fadil Harun, and Ahmed Godane. All of these 
individuals were high-value targets (HVT) and therefore candidates for kinetic strikes.215  
The effects of kinetic targeting against Al-Shabaab HVTs are consistent with the 
results found in “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” by Jenna Jordan. She 
concludes that “Terrorist organizations that possess characteristics such as bureaucratic 
forms of organization or substantial levels of communal support are more likely to 
survive attacks on their leadership than those that do not.”216 In the case of the Al-
Shabaab leaders studied, The New York Times reported that Ayro was killed by an 
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American missile strike in 2008.217 Naban was killed by American commandos in a 
daring daylight raid in 2009. Harun was killed in Mogadishu in 2011. And the BBC 
reports that the principle leader, Ahmed Godane, was killed by U.S. airstrike in 2014.218 
Yet these strikes did not collapse the organization. Al-Shabaab has shown resiliency, 
quickly replacing commanders and identifying and getting rid of informants.  
Our research supports Jenna Jordan’s conclusions. Targeting senior-level 
leadership of a matrix-structured organization is inadequate because the decision making 
and functioning of the organization is decentralized down to the regional and functional 
commanders. Top-level leadership in these organizations can simply be replaced. If 
kinetic operations represent directed strategy, then targeting middle-line management 
(functional or regional commanders) of a matrix-structured organization would be more 
effective. Moreover, if it is possible to co-opt, pull, or split a group away from the parent 
organization, significantly more damage is inflicted.  
Another feature to remember about Al-Shabaab’s missionary structured 
organization is that it is centered on an ideology. An ideology is an underlying set of 
beliefs, values, understandings and norms. Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania suggests, 
“The threat from the radicalization of ideologies and particularly from violent jihadist 
extremism will not be defeated easily.”219 As Rama goes on to note, “Military force must 
be used. But in the end, to defeat ideology we must also win the battle for the minds and 
hearts of the next generation, because it is the power of their dreams that makes change 
an everyday reality.”220 Once an organization’s ideology becomes unpopular or 
unnecessary, the organization will inevitably entropy. That is why Al-Shabaab’s ideology 
needs to be addressed. 
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As with all evolving organizations, the focus of Al-Shabaab has changed since its 
inception. Its merger with Al-Qaeda, an influx of non-Somali fighters, and its violent 
push towards more radical goals provide opportunities for exploitation. These 
developments have taken the organization away from its initial broad, popular goals, 
creating a cultural divide within the organization and with the Somali population. This 
dual focus presents opportunities for undermining local support and eroding the 
















VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Is there a place for deterrence in a world of VEOs? The answer is, yes and no. We 
observe there is no place for deterrence in a world where a consistent, practical national 
strategy has been abandoned and replaced by political posturing. Deterrence must be 
backed by credibility, commitment, understanding, and patience to be effective—all of 
which is lost without a consistent, practical strategy. The possibility of deterrence is not 
dead, however, and can be revived as conditions allow. Our research examined the 
evolution of Al-Shabaab over three phases to determine how deterrence might have been 
employed. Below is a summary of our findings, followed by recommendations and 
suggestions for further research.  
In Phase One, prior to the emergence of a VEO, effective deterrence must focus 
on understanding and improving social and cultural conditions, which, left unchanged, 
may lead to a social movement’s birth. Any deterrence by punishment or denial in this 
phase will likely be weak and ineffective, because there is no specific entity to avert. For 
the U.S. to fully understand all the variables in play in every location around the world 
would be impossible, and to attempt deterrence of this magnitude would be costly and 
unreasonable.  
The problems with deterrence in this phase are confusion between pre-emption 
and deterrence, which can lead to unforeseen consequences; the impossibility of 
quantifiable results by which to judge effectiveness; and the possibility of forestalling 
good or necessary progress. In essence, the only effective deterrents during Phase One 
are difficult to implement and fraught with problems. 
During Phase Two, the social-movement phase, deterrence gains traction. There is 
now an entity to target and a specific population to assess, understand, and apply 
deterrent strategies against. As we have noted, a social movement requires three things: 
political opportunity, cognitive liberation, and indigenous organizational strength. If any 
of these three requisites is deterred, a social movement will not take off. However, if the 
social movement is already underway, the most important deterrent during the social 
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movement phase is to encourage organic, competing social movements that undermine 
the broad popular support the VEO is attempting to cultivate. 
A VEO’s primary objective during Phase Two is to gain supporters through broad 
popular messaging. Attempting to counter the VEO message as an outsider without 
cultural comprehension may be detrimental. Rather, an indigenous, credible, competing 
organization (e.g., ASWJ or MUIS) must contradict the VEO’s message in a way that is 
appealing, factual, and demythologizing. The architects of deterrence must be careful not 
to project support for these competing organizations, lest their campaign be negated, 
derailed, or discredited. In Somalia, messages coming from foreigners fall on hostile ears.  
During Phase Three, organizational maturity emerges. We discuss the twofold 
deterrent nature of organizational design, including macro principles that apply to any 
organization and those micro, organization-specific principles based on the structure of a 
given VEO. Broad concepts from the open-systems model of organizational design tell us 
that every organization requires inputs, outputs, symbiosis with the environment, and 
feedback. Although inputs such as people and resources are likely the most important part 
of a system, every element presents additional deterrence options. At the organization-
specific level, Al-Shabaab is a combination of two structural arrangements, matrix and 
missionary. Understanding the concepts of a matrix structure tells us that pulling away its 
departments, whether functional or regional, will be much more effective at degrading 
and destroying the organization than targeting senior leaders. We also note that Al-
Shabaab’s missionary structure indicates that the ideology of the organization must also 
be defeated.  
Defeating an ideology is not a quick process; it takes time, consistency, and 
patience. Local norms must be changed and the popularity of the ideology must be shown 
to be bankrupt. Excuses and blame-dodging must be eliminated. Without anyone to 
blame but themselves, the population can turn away from violent actions and destructive 
association with organizations such as Al-Shabaab, in effect making the VEO obsolete.  
Although attempting to deter VEOs early may require less intimidation and force, 
this research suggests it may actually be more effective to deter VEOs in Phase Three, for 
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three reasons. First, applying the virtue of patience provides time to plan effective 
deterrents, based on the context. Second, a VEO typically grows narrower as it matures, 
due to its radical ideology and drive towards its true objectives. It may hijack broad, 
popular movements to gain popularity, but after taking control, narrow its focus to 
personal or organizational goals, creating distance from the population that may be 
fruitfully exploited. Finally, when a VEO’s ideology is allowed to mature, the VEO will 
often manifest corruption, incompetency, and disorganized thinking, thereby motivating 
the population to move beyond it and embrace more practical and humane forms of 
governance. Rushing in to prevent certain actions and mold regions and nations early 
may delay the natural evolution of popular sentiment turning against the VEO.  
The PPM model may be applied to the analysis of any VEO, promising a new 
way to effect deterrence throughout attention to the evolutionary growth process. 
However, such an assertion may incite controversy, insofar as it challenges the 
assumption that deterrence must be applied at or before VEO’s inception. We find, on the 
contrary, that “later is better.”   
It is impossible to know how history would have unfolded had the U.S. entered 
World War II or any other world-changing conflict from its onset; but in fact, the U.S. 
did not intervene in World War II until our vital national interests were credibly 
threatened. U.S. restraint and adherence to a set of widely understood interests allowed 
the nation to enter with a strong hand, on its own timetable. There is an important lesson 
in that measured forbearance. The financial and moral burden the U.S. assumes 
worldwide today appears unsustainable to global adversaries, who accordingly position 
themselves to exploit new opportunities as political balances shift. The proliferation of 
new, more radical VEOs221 suggests that U.S. approaches have not been effective. Our 
research leads us to conclude that it may be more efficacious to allow other nations 
latitude to create their own forms of order, however imperfect by U.S. standards, and 
allow their sociopolitical evolution to occur organically, as in our own struggle for 
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independence. Only then—as required, and with a firm grasp of context—should the U.S. 
act to secure its national interests. It is important to allow emerging states the freedom to 
observe, borrow, incorporate, and adapt by trial and error. The best policy in the 
meantime is patience, example, and intervention only as truly necessary. 
Ultimately, we recommend that the use of deterrence be understood as an 
equation of costs and benefits, and, in the case of VEOs, the focus shift from incurring 
costs towards denying benefits. Such an approach may yield a significant advance in 
achieving the ultimate strategic deterrent against VEOs: by exercising the strength, will, 
and resiliency to confront terrorist acts and deny the chaos and despair on which the 
terrorist thrives, the U.S. may subvert the adversary’s goal of manipulating mass 
behavior. Without the satisfaction of rational self-interest and tangible benefits to be 
gained from terrorist acts, there is no motivation to perform them, and costs become 
unnecessary.  
One of the glaring tragedies of history is that structural impediments to 
progress and the poverty in intellectual and political leadership 
dialectically feed on each other. Even though researchers seem to have 
almost limitless ability to come up with multiple strategy designs for 
policy makers, the ability to supply readily usable operational 
prescriptions or practicable visions for how to overcome the leadership 
deficiency and create the necessary structural conditions for [better 
governance]… [These] may suffer from the same inadequacies that hobble 
the forces that we frequently criticize.222  
For further study, the authors recommend a comparison of cases in which the U.S. 
intervened with nascent VEOs and where it did not, with outcomes examined according 
to the phase during which involvement began. We also recommend follow-up research on 
the time made available for contextual analysis, as to whether longer study tends to yield 
superior results. Additional research using the PPM model developed in this research 
may prove useful in understanding a variety of future conflicts.  
We close with an Arabian story called “The Eighteenth Camel.” 
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Once upon a time, a father died and left seventeen camels to his three 
sons. When the sons read his last will and testament, they found that the 
eldest had been given half the total camels, the middle son was given a 
third, and the youngest was to receive one ninth. 
As it was not possible to divide seventeen camels in half or seventeen by a 
third or by a ninth without killing one of the camels, the three sons began 
to quarrel. But before the fighting got out of hand, they sought the counsel 
of a wise man. The wise man read the will and after considerable thought, 
offered one of his own camels as a reward for seeking guidance. The one 
additional camel increased the sons’ total to eighteen. 
The wise man then read the father’s will: 
 Half of eighteen equals nine, so he gave the eldest son nine camels. 
 One third of eighteen equals six, so he gave the middle son six camels. 
 One ninth of eighteen equals two, so he gave the youngest son two camels. 
Adding these up, nine plus six plus two equals seventeen, which leaves 
one camel extra. The wise man then took back his camel as payment for 
sage advice and departed, leaving the now satisfied brothers to return 
home.223 
Sometimes a simple solution, such as seeing a situation but waiting till the time of 
best advantage, may be lost amid political, organizational, and individual competition, or 
through habitual disuse. To find real solutions, parties must be willing to apply new 
perspectives and solutions and cooperate to promote their legitimate and clearly defined 
interests. This research offers policymakers an eighteenth camel and urges practical and 
discerning application.  
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